Part I — Situation overview

Finance Minister Kármán András and Norwegian Finance Minister Jens Stoltenberg, former NATO Secretary General, confirmed in Budapest on 23 October the cooperation agreement under which Norway will contribute nearly HUF 93 billion to domestic development. According to the finance minister, the funds go to three areas: the green transition, healthcare and strengthening local communities (Telex, 24.hu, Portfolio). Stoltenberg also gave a speech at the ceremonial session of Parliament on the 70th anniversary of the 1956 revolution. On the same day Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, spoke at the ceremonial session about the renewal of Hungarian democracy, and then became the first Commission President to visit Budapest City Hall.

The agreement has a long history. The non-EU countries of the European Economic Area (EEA) — Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein — support the catching-up EU member states with financial mechanisms in return for access to the single market. Norway provides about 97 per cent of the funding. In the 2014–2021 cycle Hungary did not receive a single forint of the nearly HUF 78 billion earmarked for it. The dispute was over who should decide on the resources of the Norwegian Civil Fund — the smaller part of the total envelope: the government of the time wanted a state actor, which the donor countries did not accept. Hungary was the only one of the 15 beneficiary countries not to draw down the money (Telex). Foreign Minister Orbán Anita announced on 14 October that negotiations had been concluded. For the 2021–2028 period EUR 254.1 million, more than HUF 92 billion, is available. The civil-society fund had already restarted independently of this. The agreement on its implementation was signed on 6 February 2026, the first calls were published in February, and results were announced in July. The programme operates with the participation of the independent Ökotárs Foundation (24.hu, Telex).

On 20 April (EEA Grants, Norway and HUF 91.8 billion) MIAK called for an independent civil-society fund operator and a public negotiating timetable. The civil-society fund issue has since been settled. What is at stake now is the larger part, the roughly HUF 90 billion distributed through the ministries. In MIAK’s reading, the return of Norwegian money is a diplomatic success, but the real test starts now. The essence of the dispute between the two cycles was who decides on the money and under what rules. That question also arises in the government programme areas. The right answer is for the same standard of publicity and independence to apply to them as to the civil-society fund. The cycle is also starting five years late, so the pace of disbursement matters too.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide a framework for implementing the agreement. The guide of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO) on communicating the 2021–2027 cohesion policy sets out the mandatory minimum publicity for EU funds. The call schedule must be updated at least three times a year and the list of supported projects every four months, on a single national portal. Susan Rose-Ackerman (American lawyer and economist, professor at Yale University, one of the founders of the political economy of corruption) writes in Corruption and Government about the corruption risk of international aid. In her view, money leaking out of badly managed development programmes dramatically worsens project returns. She also warns that in a system otherwise in need of reform, isolated “islands of integrity” bring little value. According to the European Commission’s background note on cohesion policy, the bulk of the funds is concentrated in less developed regions, and one condition for successful use is capacity-building at local and regional level. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first makes the agreement and the calls public, the second extends the civil-society fund’s decision-making standard to the government programmes, and the third helps the money reach its territorial target.

3.1 Publicity of the agreement and the programme table, a single portal (within 15 days of signature, by 30 November 2026 at the latest)

From public statements, all that is known today is that the EUR 254.1 million goes to the green transition, healthcare and local communities. In September Orbán Anita mentioned a broader list, including cultural projects, social inclusion and institutional development. It is not public in what proportions the envelope is divided, which ministry or agency manages each programme, and by when the money must be accounted for. MIAK proposes that the Government publish the full text of the cooperation agreement, together with its annexes, within 15 days of signature. If the agreement has already been signed, this should happen by 30 November 2026 at the latest. It should be accompanied by a programme table: programme area, envelope, programme operator, planned dates of calls and the accounting deadline. The second element is the single portal. For EU cohesion funds, the DG REGIO guide (see 6.4.1) requires a call schedule updated at least three times a year and a project list updated every four months. MIAK proposes that the same standard should voluntarily apply to the Norwegian programmes, on the same national portal where the data on EU funds appear. MIAK’s blog post of 8 August (6,000 billion forints of EU funds) proposed a project-level public-money dashboard for the EU envelope. The Norwegian funds should be part of it rather than appearing on a separate, hard-to-search platform. The proposal applies programme point KP3 on transparent foreign policy and programme point A1 on the public-money dashboard.

3.2 The civil-society fund’s standard in the government programmes too: independent review, conflict-of-interest declaration, reasoned decision (with the first call for proposals, by 31 March 2027 at the latest)

The dispute between the two cycles was decided by the donor countries’ demand for an independent decision-maker for the civil-society funds. That is how the civil-society fund works today. In the government programme areas, however, the ministries decide, and the public does not know under what procedure. According to Rose-Ackerman’s argument (see 6.4.2), an isolated, well-functioning programme — the “island of integrity” — achieves little on its own if the surrounding system works by different rules. MIAK proposes three rules for every Norwegian programme area. First: applications should be reviewed by at least two independent experts, and ministry representatives should not form a majority on the decision-making body. Second: every reviewer and decision-maker should make a public conflict-of-interest declaration and disclose any link to an applicant. Third: grant decisions should be published with their reasons and the scores, and rejected applicants should receive written reasons. The programme-operating ministry should set out the rules in the call for proposals, and the Government should assess implementation at an annual review held jointly with the donor countries. The proposal is also a testing ground. If independent review works in the Norwegian programmes, it offers a model for reforming the allocation of EU cohesion funds as well. This is a direct application of programme point A8 on accountability in cohesion policy.

3.3 Disadvantaged areas: a ring-fenced envelope, advance payments and help with applications (with the first call of the “local communities” programme area, in the first half of 2027)

The “local communities” programme area achieves its aim only if the money is not concentrated in the settlements and organisations with the strongest application capacity. Organisations in small settlements and disadvantaged districts often miss out because they have no staff to write applications and cannot pre-finance the project. Alongside the concentration of funds, the European Commission’s background note (see 6.4.3) names local capacity-building as a condition for successful use. MIAK proposes three elements. First: at least 40 per cent of the programme area’s envelope should go to applicants from the districts that are most disadvantaged according to the development index. Second: winning small-settlement municipalities and civil-society organisations should receive at least half of the grant as an advance payment. Third: from the publication of the call, the programme operator should provide free application-writing and project-management advice in disadvantaged districts. The programme operator should publish a quarterly report on implementation: how many applications were received, how many won, and how much money reached the most disadvantaged districts. This report also shows the pace of disbursement, which is a particular risk in a cycle starting late. In the previous cycle the money was lost because of the dispute. In this cycle slowness must not cause a similar loss. The proposal applies programme point TE1 on the micro-regional development index, programme point TE2 on data-driven allocation of funds and cohesion programme point SZ14 to the Norwegian funds.

A common principle links the three proposals. The ten-year dispute over Norwegian money was about how independent and public the allocation of public money is. It is not enough to apply this standard to the civil-society fund alone. According to the literature, a good rule is worth something if it extends to the entire fund-allocation system, and if the money also reaches those who lack the capacity to compete for it.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
External relations A public agreement and independent review strengthen the donor countries’ trust and offer a model for EU funds The government-critical side may frame the joint review with the donor countries as a sovereignty issue
Public administration Independent review and reasoned decisions reduce the risk of abuse and favouritism More experts, more documents, slower decisions — in a cycle starting late, this may also jeopardise disbursement
Disadvantaged areas The ring-fenced envelope, advance payments and advice make smaller organisations competitive too Advance payments increase the financial risk of non-performing projects; strong follow-up is needed
Budget Norwegian funds substitute for domestic development spending, and the public programme table helps budget planning If accounting for the funds slips, programmes must be completed with domestic money

The most important trade-off lies between proposals 3.2 and 3.3. Independent review and detailed reasoning slow decisions down, while the cycle starts five years late and the money has to be spent. According to MIAK, the two are not mutually exclusive if the review rules are fixed in the very first call rather than shaped afterwards through individual decisions. Speed must not come at the cost of transparency. In the previous cycle, no money arrived precisely because of the dispute over decision-making powers. If the decision-making rules remain vague now, that risks the donor countries’ trust. The risk of proposal 3.3 is the advance payment. Some small-settlement projects may stall, and recovery is then difficult. The quarterly report and project-level milestones reduce this risk but do not eliminate it entirely. According to MIAK, this risk must be accepted, because without advance payments the most disadvantaged applicants cannot even take part.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (proposed KPIs)

MIAK proposes tracking the following key performance indicators (KPIs):

  • Publicity of the agreement: whether the full text of the cooperation agreement and the envelopes by programme area, with programme operators and deadlines, are published by 30 November 2026.
  • Single portal: whether, by 31 March 2027, the call schedule and project list of the Norwegian programmes appear on the same national portal as the data on EU funds, updated every four months.
  • Independent review: whether the first call for proposals sets out the rules on independent review, conflict-of-interest declarations and reasoned decisions.
  • Territorial targeting: whether, by the end of 2027, at least 40 per cent of the grants awarded in the “local communities” programme area reached the most disadvantaged districts.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the Government to make public the agreement with Norway and the breakdown of the envelope by programme. Norwegian calls should appear on the same portal and with the same frequency as those for EU funds. In the ministerial programmes, too, independent experts should review applications, with reasoned decisions. And disadvantaged areas should receive a ring-fenced envelope, advance payments and help with applications. The proposals concern two of MIAK’s foundational values. Transparency, because the loss of Norwegian money a decade ago stemmed precisely from the dispute over the publicity and independence of decisions, and that lesson must now be applied to the whole envelope. Universal representation, because support for “local communities” achieves its aim only if it also reaches small settlements that lack application capacity.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

Liberal-left band. Telex presented the agreement from the angle of its history. It recalled that not a single forint arrived in the previous cycle and that the civil-society fund had restarted earlier. From von der Leyen’s speech at the ceremonial session, it put the message about “reviving” democracy in its headline. 444.hu interviewed Dan Jørgensen, EU Commissioner for Energy and Housing. The commissioner spoke about the housing crisis and the burden of heating bills, and did not address the Norwegian funds. In the material processed, HVG did not write separately about the Norway Grants.

Public-affairs band. Based on the finance minister’s statement, 24.hu described the three target areas and the Stoltenberg family’s link to 1956. In an earlier article on 17 October it pointed out that the civil-society calls had already been launched in February, before the change of government. ATV and Index presented von der Leyen’s City Hall visit in a factual manner, based on the Mayor of Budapest’s statement, and did not write about the Norwegian funds.

Economic band. Portfolio reported on the agreement in a short article following the finance minister’s statement. It also mentioned consultations on the budget, euro adoption and the internal market, but did not analyse the details of fund allocation.

Government-critical conservative band. Magyar Nemzet criticised the ceremonial session: according to its report, praise for the relationship between the European Union and the new government received conspicuously great emphasis instead of the 1956 freedom fighters. In an opinion piece the paper interpreted the Commission President’s visit as a sign of Brussels’ influence. The paper also reported on the prime minister’s speech in Kossuth Square, with its “reliable ally” message. In the material processed, it did not write about the Norway Grants. Material from Mandiner and Népszava was not in the processed set.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Value Source
Hungary’s 2021–2028 envelope EUR 254.1 million, more than HUF 92 billion (nearly HUF 93 billion according to the finance minister) Orbán Anita, 14 October 2026, quoted by Telex; Kármán András, 23 October 2026
Target areas green transition, healthcare, local communities Statement by Kármán András, quoted by Telex, 24.hu, Portfolio
Broader scope mentioned in September green investment, local communities, cultural projects, social inclusion, healthcare and institutional development Orbán Anita, 18 September 2026, quoted by Telex
Norway’s share of funding about 97% Telex, 14 October 2026
Hungary’s envelope in the previous (2014–2021) cycle nearly HUF 78 billion, of which no payment arrived Telex
Civil Fund envelope in the previous cycle about HUF 4 billion Telex, 4 July 2025
Beneficiary countries 15; in the previous cycle Hungary alone did not draw down the funds Telex, 4 July 2025
Norwegian Civil Fund, current cycle about EUR 20–23 million until 2031; implementation agreement: 6 February 2026; first calls in February, results announced in July Telex; 24.hu, 17 October 2026
Conclusion of negotiations 14 October 2026 Orbán Anita, quoted by Telex
Confirmation of the agreement 23 October 2026, Kármán András and Jens Stoltenberg Telex, 24.hu, Portfolio

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — publicity of the agreement and negotiating documents (KP3), the Norwegian–Hungarian economic relationship as part of economic diplomacy (KP8), regular maintenance of alliance relations (KP24);
  • Economy (background material) — incorporating the Norwegian funds into 2027 budget planning, domestic co-financing and accounting risk;
  • Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points) — targeting by development index (TE1) and data-driven allocation of external funds (TE2);
  • Social policy (programme points) — full use of cohesion and external funds for social inclusion (SZ14).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 European Commission (DG REGIO): Communicating Cohesion Policy in 2021-2027

The guide of the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy summarises the communication and transparency rules of the 2021–2027 cohesion policy. Its starting point is that regulation has gradually moved from earlier simple publicity requirements towards detailed communication and transparency obligations. According to the document, each member state must operate a single national portal giving access to all programmes. On the tasks of managing authorities, it states:

“Managing authorities are responsible for publishing on the programme website or on the single national portal the timetable of planned and launched calls for proposals. The timetable must be updated at least three times a year.” (MIAK’s own translation from the Hungarian rendering)

According to the guide, the list of supported projects must be updated every four months. Projects of strategic importance have separate visibility obligations, and financial corrections may be applied to beneficiaries that do not comply with the rules. Applied to the Norwegian programmes: these rules legally apply to EU funds, but nothing prevents the Government from voluntarily applying the same standard to the Norwegian envelope (3.1). This way Hungarian beneficiaries and the public can see all external funds in one place and in the same format.

📖 Source: European Commission (DG REGIO): Communicating Cohesion Policy in 2021-2027

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

The chapter of Rose-Ackerman’s book on the role of the international community deals with the corruption risk of aid programmes. She illustrates the effect with a simple numerical example. If 20 per cent of the money in a development programme leaks away through bribery-related overpricing and losses, a project that could be delivered for 80 million dollars costs 100 million. It must then produce a much higher return to be worthwhile at all. The author also warns that corrupt officials favour projects with the greatest potential for private gain. On reforms, she writes:

“One must also beware of creating isolated islands of virtue in the midst of an otherwise deeply corrupt system. Creating islands of integrity may be a good first step, but without deeper reforms they will be of limited value.” (MIAK’s own translation from the Hungarian rendering)

Rose-Ackerman was not writing about the Hungarian situation, and today’s Hungarian institutional system is not the same as the cases she analysed. The core of the idea, however, applies. The Norwegian Civil Fund became the subject of the dispute between the two cycles because of independent decision-making, and that is how it works today. If this standard applies only to a small part of the envelope and not to the larger part, the civil-society fund remains exactly such an island. Proposal 3.2 therefore extends the rules on independent review to the government programme areas as well.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999), chapter on the role of the international community

6.4.3 European Commission: Background note on cohesion policy

The European Commission’s background note on cohesion policy starts from the premise that cohesion policy is inherently spatial. The bulk of its funds is concentrated in less developed member states and regions in order to help them catch up and to reduce economic, social and territorial disparities within the Union. Among the tasks for the post-2028 period, the note also names the following:

“Lay the foundations for successful preparation and implementation after 2028, including by supporting good governance and capacity-building at regional and local level.” (MIAK’s own translation from the Hungarian rendering)

The background note thus treats concentration and local capacity together: the money reaches its target if, on the receiving side, there is someone able to apply, implement and account for it. Applied to the Norwegian envelope: the ring-fenced disadvantaged-area envelope within the “local communities” programme area is useful only if applicants from the most disadvantaged districts also receive advance payments and professional assistance (3.3).

📖 Source: European Commission: Background note on cohesion policy

6.5 International comparison

The international data portal of the EEA and Norway Grants. The international portal run by the donor countries (eeagrants.org) publishes data by beneficiary country, programme and project. The data on the Hungarian programmes will also appear there. Proposal 3.1 asks for a domestic presentation of these data, unified with EU funds, in Hungarian and with the search functions of the domestic portal.

Poland: the largest beneficiary. Poland is the largest beneficiary of the EEA and Norway Grants, and it manages the programmes through a national focal point with a public list of programmes. The lesson for Hungarian implementation: even a large envelope can be managed transparently if programme operators and calls are visible in one place.

The EU cohesion policy’s own standard. The EU rules presented in 6.4.1 — a single portal, a call schedule updated at least three times a year, a project list updated every four months — are mandatory for every member state for EU funds. Applying them voluntarily to the Norwegian envelope is not a new burden but the extension of a system that already works.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP8 — Integration of economic diplomacy
  • KP24 — Cyclical maintenance of alliance relations

Territorial inequality and rural policy

  • TE1 — Micro-regional development index
  • TE2 — Data-driven allocation of EU cohesion funds

Social policy

  • SZ14 — Cohesion Pillar 2.0 — maximum use of Hungary’s allocation

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A8 — Accountability in cohesion policy

Proposed new programme point: Uniform rules for external funds — the EU cohesion policy’s publicity standard, together with independent review and reasoned decisions, also for non-EU external grants (EEA and Norway Grants, other bilateral funds) — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 24 October 2026 — topic 5):

Supplementary background sources (outside the monitor, referenced from the source articles):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 European Commission (DG REGIO): Communicating Cohesion Policy in 2021-2027
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform (1999)
  • 📖 European Commission: Background note on cohesion policy

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3, KP8, KP24)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Territorial inequality and rural policy (programme points; programme point ID: TE1, TE2)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ14)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A8)
  • MIAK press monitor, 24 October 2026 — topic 5, score: 79/100

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