Part I — Situation overview

On Thursday 22 October, Iranian state television, citing the navy of the Revolutionary Guard, reported that seven oil tankers had caught fire or been damaged in the Strait of Hormuz during the night. The ships were hit by an Iranian strike or by sea mines. AP could not independently verify the claim (AP News). The British military maritime monitoring service did not report these incidents, but according to it, October saw the most reported attacks against commercial shipping since the opening weeks of the war in March. The shipping data analysis firm Lloyd’s List Intelligence counted 28 attacks in October. Meanwhile, night-time tanker traffic sailing under US Navy protection keeps oil shipments from the Gulf at roughly pre-war levels, but at a significant extra cost. North Sea Brent, the benchmark quotation for European oil, rose by 4 per cent on the same day to 113.17 dollars a barrel. This is a five-month high; at the beginning of October it still stood below 97 dollars (AP News).

On the same day in Italy, the government granted fuel support to hauliers, farmers and fishers by emergency decree. With this it sought to end the road blockades that had been going on for weeks, which had emptied shop shelves in southern and central Italy and halted dairies and pasta factories. The cause of the protest was the high diesel price and the delay of the promised fuel tax credit (Euractiv). In France, the cost-of-living protests of 17 October, with some 550 thousand participants, turned into riots and looting. Paris extended its partial curfew until Monday, and Marseille and Lyon ordered a complete ban on protests for the weekend (BBC). According to Fatih Birol, head of the International Energy Agency (IEA, the energy security cooperation organisation of advanced countries), Europe can expect higher gas prices this winter (Al Jazeera). On 22 October Birol held talks in Budapest with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister and the Minister for Economy and Energy (Telex, Portfolio).

MIAK has already responded to the Hormuz shock. On 15 August it asked for a fuel-shock protocol announced in advance with price thresholds and funding. On 23 September it proposed income-based energy support and time-limited bridging support for hauliers. On 3 October it asked for an ex-post analysis of the payment of the diesel subsidy. It stands by these and does not repeat them here. The new element is the social dimension. In Italy it was not the absence of support but its delay that drove the hauliers onto the roads. In France, cost-of-living discontent turned into violence because the government started talking to the protesters too late. MIAK’s reading: in the second wave of the crisis, the bottleneck is no longer the choice of instrument but the reliability of implementation and the channel of dialogue. Support paid late or poorly communicated can be more expensive than if nothing had been promised at all.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. The Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025 country report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) recommends, as a lesson of the previous energy crisis, that income support for high energy prices be temporary and targeted, and that it preserve the incentive to save energy. For agricultural support, it proposes linking crisis aid to a risk-management condition. This is the yardstick for what the content of rapid crisis support should be. The World Bank’s World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior offers two behavioural propositions. The first: scarcity of money itself worsens decision-making, so the timing and predictability of support have value in their own right. The second: most people are conditional cooperators, that is, they shoulder burdens as long as they see that others do too. Joseph E. Stiglitz (Nobel Prize-winning American economist, former chief economist of the World Bank) writes in his book Globalization and Its Discontents that riots following the sudden withdrawal of livelihood subsidies are foreseeable. If people have no other means of expressing their grievances, they take to the streets. Order is not fully restored afterwards even if the subsidy is given back. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first concerns the reliability of payment of crisis support already announced, the second the framework for consultation with hauliers’ and agricultural interest groups, and the third regular public information on the winter energy situation. None of them is a new support instrument. All three ensure that the instruments that already exist, or that were proposed in earlier MIAK analyses, work credibly in times of crisis as well.

According to Euractiv, the Italian blockades were triggered by two things: the high diesel price and the fact that the fuel tax credit promised to hauliers was paid late. Hungary also has a diesel subsidy paid in instalments. According to the schedule presented in MIAK’s 3 October analysis, the remaining instalments arrive on 30 October, 13 November and 7 December (Magyar Nemzet). MIAK proposes that the National Tax and Customs Administration (NAV) and the Hungarian State Treasury launch a weekly public payment log before the 13 November instalment. The log should show how many eligible recipients have been paid, in what amount, how many applications or complaints are pending, and what the average processing time of payment is. Thereafter, by 31 December 2026, the Government should fix the disbursement deadline in the government decrees establishing crisis support, and for support established by statute it should submit a corresponding amendment to the National Assembly. If the state misses the deadline, the eligible recipient should receive a late-payment surcharge without having to apply, at the same rate as the late-payment surcharge charged by the NAV. The same should apply to every later fuel concession for hauliers or agriculture. According to the World Bank report (see 6.4.2), the decisions of a cash-strapped household or small business are worsened by uncertainty itself. That is why an exact date is help in its own right, not an administrative detail. The proposal is an application of programme point SZ1 on targeted support and programme point KI10 on proactive state services. The log could be the first, narrow scope of the A1 public-money dashboard. The budgetary impact of the guarantee should be shown within the framework of the G20 impact assessment.

3.2 A sectoral crisis-consultation framework fixed in advance, with trigger signals (government resolution by 30 November 2026)

The Italian government reached an agreement with the hauliers’ associations weeks after the blockades began, and groups left outside the agreement continued to protest in Campania and Apulia (Euractiv). A French opposition MP told Politico Europe that the Education Minister did not meet the leaders of the student movement for weeks, even though the initial demands were entirely practical. MIAK proposes that by 30 November 2026 the Government set up, by government resolution, a permanent sectoral crisis-consultation forum. Its members should be the national interest groups of haulage, agriculture and public transport, together with the ministries concerned. The forum should be convened not by protest but by a trigger signal fixed in advance. Such a signal could be the national average retail price of diesel exceeding the average of the previous 12 months by 30 per cent in two consecutive weeks. This threshold is the same as the compensation threshold of the energy-price shock preparedness plan (G25). The forum should meet within 72 hours of the signal occurring, and a public summary of the meeting should be produced within 48 hours. The forum does not invent new support. It chooses from the instruments of the protocol proposed on 15 August and agrees on the schedule of payment. According to the OECD recommendation (see 6.4.1), agricultural crisis aid can be linked to participation in risk management. This can also be applied within the framework of the forum. The World Bank’s finding on conditional cooperation (see 6.4.2) shows that burden-sharing is accepted when it is visible that everyone contributes. The proposal is the implementation side of G25 and K7, and its model is the tripartite consultation forum of FO10. Orderly protest is part of dialogue in times of crisis too. Article VIII of the Fundamental Law guarantees everyone the right to peaceful assembly. Under the Act on the Right of Assembly, restrictions are decided by the police as the assembly authority, in an individual, reasoned decision that can be challenged in court. According to MIAK, the French model of a general, advance protest ban should not be followed.

3.3 A public winter preparedness report updated every two weeks (first edition by 15 November 2026, then until the end of the heating season, 31 March 2027)

In an interview with Telex, Birol said that storage levels are rather low at the start of the winter season. A significant part of the Qatari liquefied natural gas (LNG) intended for Europe is going to Asia, so Europe and Asia will compete for LNG arriving from other sources. In his view, hope is not a strategy. Birol also said that the cross-border interconnectors built since 2022, including the Hungarian–Slovak and Hungarian–Romanian ones, improve the situation (Telex). According to the analyst speaking to Politico Europe, governments’ energy-price protection measures are expiring one after another, so social movements can be expected. The French President, for his part, spoke about fake images of the riots made with artificial intelligence being spread (Telex). MIAK proposes that the Minister for Economy and Energy publish the first winter preparedness report by 15 November 2026, and then update it every two weeks until the end of the heating season. The report should contain five pieces of data. The first is the fill level of domestic gas storage and the procurement contracted for the heating season. The second is the expected heating cost of households by income decile, with and without the regulated price. The third is diesel and crude oil stocks in days, by product type. The fourth is the used and remaining amount of the 500-billion-forint Emergency Fund (Havária Alap, a reserve created in the amended 2026 budget for drought and the energy crisis). The fifth is the current status of the trigger signals under 3.2. The report should be easy to understand and machine-readable. When fake news spreads, government communication should refer to it. The proposal is the public side of K7 energy-market shock resilience and of the G25 preparedness plan. It is linked to the annual resilience assessment of HV7 and to programme point A13 on resilience to disinformation. According to the OECD analysis (see 6.4.1), in the previous crisis it was the EU internal energy market that reallocated scarce volumes between member states. Hungarian supply therefore also depends on neighbouring markets, and the report must make this visible. The report does not repeat the storage pre-calculation proposed on 22 August or the Emergency Fund accounting requested on 8 September. It brings them together on a single, regularly updated platform that is understandable to lay readers as well.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: the credibility of crisis support depends on its predictability. Money that arrives on time, a negotiating schedule fixed in advance and regular public data build the same trust. According to Stiglitz’s thesis (see 6.4.3), riots are foreseeable, and where grievances have no channel, the street becomes the channel. MIAK’s aim is for this channel to be available in Hungary before the street.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy Predictable payment reduces liquidity disruptions for hauliers and agriculture, and thus the likelihood of supply chains breaking down The late-payment surcharge causes extra spending if the capacity of the implementing bodies is not expanded
Budget The weekly log and the winter report give early warning if the Emergency Fund is running out Public threshold values create pressure to convene the forum even when budgetary room for manoeuvre is narrow
Society Consultation fixed in advance reduces the likelihood of protest turning into blockades or violence Groups left outside the forum may continue to protest, as in Italy
Public administration The payment log makes the work of the NAV and the Treasury measurable Data collection is a burden at the peak of the crisis
Energy security The winter report is a point of reference against fake news and shows dependence on neighbouring markets A report containing bad news may itself drive up expectations

The most important question to weigh is the public disclosure of threshold values. A threshold announced in advance also sends a signal to the negotiating parties and may strengthen their bargaining position. MIAK nevertheless proposes disclosure. The Italian and French cases show that unpredictability is more expensive: the blockade hit food processing, the riots hit government bond yields. According to AP, French bond yields continued to rise amid concerns about debt, and the protests are pushing the indebted government to increase spending. The proposal becomes risky if the forum turns into a permanent bargaining table of the crisis. This is limited by the two conditions of the trigger signal: the 30 per cent deviation and the two consecutive weeks.

The second dilemma is the French model. A protest ban may reduce the likelihood of riots in the short term, but it closes the legal channel for grievances. According to Politico, a committee of inquiry has been set up in the French parliament on how the government handled the protests. Stiglitz (see 6.4.3) warns that disorderly street violence also destroys confidence in the economy. MIAK therefore proposes not banning protest, but addressing its causes in advance.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests following the performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators) below. These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • Share of crisis support payments made on time. Target: at least 95 per cent for the 13 November and 7 December instalments of the diesel subsidy. It is worth following whether the weekly payment log appears before the 13 November instalment.
  • Establishment of the sectoral crisis-consultation forum. Target: government resolution by 30 November 2026. It is worth following whether it meets within 72 hours of the trigger signal, and whether the summary is public within 48 hours.
  • Regularity of the winter preparedness report. Target: first edition by 15 November 2026, then every two weeks until 31 March 2027, with all five data areas.
  • Number of sectoral blockades causing supply disruption in Hungary during the heating season. Target: the occurrence of the trigger signal should not lead to a blockade.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government. The NAV and the Treasury should launch a weekly payment log before the 13 November diesel subsidy instalment, and by the end of the year the Government should fix a payment deadline with a late-payment surcharge for every crisis support scheme. By 30 November a sectoral crisis-consultation forum should be set up, convened by a price signal fixed in advance, not by a road blockade. From 15 November until the end of the heating season, a winter preparedness report in plain language should appear every two weeks.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, transparency and accountability are concerned here. Transparency, because in times of crisis the gap left by missing official data is filled by rumour and fake images. The regular report and the payment log narrow this space. Accountability, because a promise is only worth something if its fulfilment can be demanded. The payment deadline and the late-payment surcharge expect from the state the same discipline that the state expects from taxpayers.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international press, AP discussed the tanker attacks in a security-policy frame, from the angle of the Israeli election and the risk of the war resuming. In a separate report it presented the market impact: the fall of AI-related stocks and the rise of the oil price. Euractiv–Rapporteur framed the Italian decree as a supply crisis, with empty shelves, halted food-industry plants and farmers’ associations taking action against the blockades. Politico Europe’s comprehensive analysis described the cost-of-living crisis as a European phenomenon, approaching it from the angle of the upcoming Spanish, French, Greek and Italian elections and the strengthening of far-right parties. The BBC focused on public order: curfew, protest ban, fast-track proceedings. Al Jazeera’s Birol interview presented energy as a geopolitical weapon. Deutsche Welle wrote about the Portuguese housing tent camps and the anti-corruption student protests in Albania, that is, it showed other faces of cost-of-living discontent.

In the domestic press, the topic appeared as topic 10 of the 22 October press monitor. 444.hu highlighted the pressure on households through Eurostat food-price data, and the fact that the protests do not form a unified movement (most of the article was not publicly downloadable). HVG wrote in a frame of young people’s shattered expectations and the images of French destruction. Telex published Macron’s reaction to foreign leaders’ statements about the French events. According to the article, Péter Magyar argued in a Facebook post, citing the riots, for a strict Hungarian migration policy, and Macron called claims blaming immigrants “stupid”. In the economic segment, Portfolio highlighted the suspicion of hybrid warfare and the statement of the Italian defence minister. In the conservative segment, Magyar Nemzet put the emphasis on law enforcement and the deployment of soldiers on the streets (only the lead of the article was available).

The common gap in the framings is that the domestic outlets treated the French and Italian events as a migration, security or mood issue. None of them asked how the Hungarian diesel subsidy and the consultation with hauliers measure up to the Italian lesson.

6.2 Facts and data

The oil and tanker market (AP News):

Indicator Value
Brent quotation, 22 October 2026 113.17 dollars/barrel (+4%), five-month high
Brent quotation at the beginning of October below 97 dollars
Attacks on ships in October 28 (Lloyd’s List Intelligence), the most since the start of the war
Capacity of the Saudi east–west pipeline bypassing the Strait of Hormuz increased from 2 million barrels a day to 7 million barrels a day (according to the head of Aramco)

The Italian decree (Euractiv, 22 October 2026):

Item Amount
Already earmarked for the hauliers’ fuel tax credit 434 million euros
Additional funding for the hauliers’ tax credit 106 million euros
Agricultural diesel 60 million euros, a discount of at most 45 cents per litre, for more than 120 million litres
Fisheries 10 million euros

The associations that signed the agreement suspended the protest; hauliers from Sicily and Calabria are negotiating with Transport Minister Matteo Salvini on 27 October. In Campania and Apulia, groups left outside the agreement continued the blockade. Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called this intimidation and indicated that the government would enforce the law making road blockades a criminal offence (Euractiv).

The French situation (BBC, unless otherwise indicated):

  • Some 550 thousand people took part in the protests of 17 October.
  • In fast-track proceedings, 217 people were sentenced to prison, 2,700 were taken into custody, and more than a thousand appeared in court. According to the Justice Minister, half of those taken into custody had no criminal record.
  • In Paris, movement is prohibited around Place de la République and Les Halles between 11 pm and 6 am until Monday. Marseille and Lyon banned all protests for the weekend, and public transport is suspended in Marseille on Saturday.
  • Police presence is being increased by 20 per cent compared with the previous weekend.
  • According to Politico, more than 2.2 million posts appeared on X about the Saturday protests (according to Visibrain data), three times as many as at the 2018 peak of the yellow-vest crisis.

The European gas market (Telex, Birol interview): previously around one fifth of global oil and LNG shipments and one third of world fertiliser trade passed through the Strait of Hormuz. 80 per cent of the stocks released by the IEA have already been used up. Russian gas’s share of EU gas supply has fallen from around 40 per cent before the invasion to below 10 per cent. LNG import capacity has nearly doubled over the past four years. According to Phuc-Vinh Nguyen, head of the energy centre of the Jacques Delors Institute, speaking to Politico Europe, Germany’s gas reserves are at a historic low, and tension in the gas market may spill over into electricity markets and neighbouring countries.

The domestic background: according to the 22 October domestic press monitor, the act amending the 2026 budget has been promulgated, creating a 500-billion-forint Emergency Fund for drought and the energy crisis. The schedule of the remaining instalments of the diesel subsidy was presented by Magyar Nemzet (see MIAK’s 3 October analysis).

Discrepancies between sources:

Question Claim 1 Claim 2
Number of people taken into custody in France 2,700 (BBC, statement of the Justice Minister) around 2,400 (HVG)
The tanker attacks seven tankers damaged (Iranian state television) AP could not independently confirm it, the British maritime monitor did not report it (AP News)
Name of the French Interior Minister Jean-Didier Berger (BBC, one paragraph of the same article) Laurent Nuñez (BBC, another paragraph of the same article)

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Economy (programme points) — the energy-price shock preparedness plan and its compensation threshold (programme point ID: G25); ex-post impact assessment of crisis support and the cost of the payment guarantee (programme point ID: G20);
  • Social policy (programme points) — targeted support arriving on time (programme point ID: SZ1);
  • Environment and climate (programme points) — energy-market shock resilience, winter gas supply (programme point ID: K7);
  • Agriculture (background material) — the price of agricultural diesel as a production cost, and the conditions of crisis aid;
  • Transport and infrastructure (background material) — haulage as the most sensitive point of the supply chain; the longer-term effect of road cost reductions on the competitiveness of rail.

Beyond the areas identified by the monitor, the proposal also applies programme points of Public administration and e-government (KI10), Transparency and anti-corruption policy (A1, A13), Employment policy (FO10) and Defence (HV7).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 OECD: Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025

The OECD’s 2025 EU country report looks back at what the 2023 report recommended during the energy crisis and what has happened since. According to the recommendation, fiscal policy should be prudent while ensuring that:

“income support for high energy prices is temporary and targeted and preserves energy saving incentives.”

that is, income support for high energy prices should be temporary and targeted, and should not remove the incentive to save energy. The report records that support linked to the energy crisis had largely been phased out by the end of 2024. According to the energy market chapter, during the crisis the EU internal energy market successfully reallocated scarce volumes between member states. Gas, however, continues to set the electricity price, because the gas-fired power plants entering at peak times have the highest production cost. The chapter on the common agricultural policy recommends that direct payments reach farmers in a targeted way, linked to concrete objectives. Eligibility for crisis support could be linked to producers’ participation in risk-reduction programmes.

For the present situation, this yields three conclusions. Rapid crisis support must also remain temporary and targeted, which is why 3.1 asks not for a new entitlement but for the exact fulfilment of existing ones. The agricultural diesel concession can be linked to a risk-management condition in the forum under 3.2. Winter gas supply also depends on neighbouring markets, so the report under 3.3 must also show the import and interconnection side.

📖 Source: OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025 (OECD Publishing, 2025)

6.4.2 World Bank: World Development Report 2015

The World Bank’s 2015 development report summarises the findings of behavioural economics for public policy. According to chapter four, poverty is not merely a lack of money. The daily forced decisions of scarcity also tie up attention and mental resources, and this worsens economic decisions. The report’s example concerns Indian sugarcane farmers who receive their income once a year, at harvest. In the lean period before the harvest they performed worse on cognitive tests than afterwards. The report therefore recommends aligning important decisions and assistance with the period when the mental capacity of those concerned is predictably low.

Chapter two deals with social behaviour. According to experiments carried out in eight countries, most people are conditional cooperators:

“People often behave as conditional cooperators–that is, individuals who prefer to cooperate as long as others are cooperating.”

that is, people are willing to cooperate as long as they see that others are cooperating too. For Hungarian crisis management, this means two things. For a small haulage business or a farmer, support that is promised but arrives at an uncertain time is itself a burden, so the deadline and the log under 3.1 are part of the help. And burden-sharing is accepted when it is visible that the other actors, including the state, are doing their share. This is made visible by the public summary under 3.2 and the report under 3.3.

📖 Source: World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior (chapters 2 and 4)

6.4.3 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

In criticising the crisis management of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Stiglitz discusses in several places the riots that follow the withdrawal of livelihood subsidies. One of his propositions is about why people take to the streets:

“Left with no alternatives, no way to express their concern, to press for change, people riot.”

that is, if people have no other way to express their concern and to force change, riots break out. He adds that the street is not the place where issues are debated and compromises are reached. Writing about the 1998 crisis in Indonesia, he states that riots are foreseeable, not with certainty but with high probability, and that they do not restore business confidence. He also describes how, when food subsidies were restored after the riots, the disrupted social order was not restored. Indeed, bitterness grew, because people asked why the subsidy had been taken away if the funds for it had been there.

In the Italian case there was no withdrawal but a delay, yet the mechanism is similar. The hauliers experienced the delay as a sign that the promise was worth nothing, and with no other channel, they blocked the road. The irreversibility thesis also indicates that money paid after a blockade costs more than money paid on time. The forum under 3.2 is needed so that grievances have a channel before they reach the street.

📖 Source: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents (W. W. Norton, 2002)

6.5 International comparison

The Italian example shows the cost of delay. The government had already earmarked the hauliers’ tax credit earlier, so the money was there, yet the price of the delay was a blockade lasting weeks, food shortages and ruined crops. The solution in the end was a binding emergency decree with additional funding, that is, more expensive than fulfilling the original promise on time.

The French example shows the cost of a lack of dialogue. According to Politico, the students’ initially simple demands about the state of schools went unanswered for weeks, and then merged with the cost-of-living protests. According to AP, French government bond yields continued to rise amid concerns about debt, and the protests are pushing the indebted government to increase spending. In Spain, according to Politico, parliament rejected the government’s housing package, the Prime Minister called an early election, and the first general strike in 15 years has been called for 11 November.

The German case shows the winter risk. According to the analyst quoted, German gas reserves are at a historic low, but Germany has more budgetary room for manoeuvre to cushion the impact. Hungary has less budgetary room for manoeuvre, and without a maritime terminal it accesses LNG via neighbouring markets. That is why, in Hungarian preparation, besides financial reserves, predictability and public data are the cheapest tools.

Economy

  • G20 — Economic policy impact assessment system (Drucker audit)
  • G25 — Energy-price shock preparedness plan

Social policy

  • SZ1 — Targeted support

Environment and climate

  • K7 — Energy-market shock resilience

Public administration and e-government

  • KI10 — “Once-only Plus” — proactive state services

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A13 — Resilience to disinformation

Employment policy

  • FO10 — Modernising wage bargaining — tripartite wage-consultation forum

Defence

  • HV7 — Societal defence resilience

Proposed new programme point: Crisis support payment guarantee: for all state support established in times of crisis, a disbursement deadline fixed in law, an automatic late-payment surcharge in case of delay, and a weekly public payment log — for the Social policy area.

6.7 List of sources

International press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 23 October 2026 — topic 2):

Domestic press sources (MIAK press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topics 4 and 10):

Knowledge-base references (reference books and legal sources):

  • 📖 OECD: OECD Economic Surveys: European Union and Euro Area 2025 (2025)
  • 📖 World Bank: World Development Report 2015 — Mind, Society, and Behavior (2015)
  • 📖 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents (2002)
  • 📖 Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article VIII(1)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point IDs: G20, G25)
  • MIAK policy area: Social policy (programme points; programme point ID: SZ1)
  • MIAK policy area: Environment and climate (programme points; programme point ID: K7)
  • MIAK policy area: Agriculture (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (programme points; programme point ID: KI10)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A1, A13)
  • MIAK policy area: Employment policy (programme points; programme point ID: FO10)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV7)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 23 October 2026 — topic 2, score: 88/100
  • MIAK press monitor, 22 October 2026 — topic 4, score: 87/100, and topic 10, score: 56/100

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