Part I — Situation overview

On Tuesday, 6 October 2026, at around 3 a.m. local time, aerial and naval drones hit two merchant ships in the Black Sea, roughly 112 kilometres from the eastern Bulgarian port town of Byala. The location was in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone. This is a belt extending up to 200 nautical miles from the coast, in which the coastal state exercises sovereign rights over natural resources. The zone, however, is not the state’s territory, and navigation there is free. According to Bulgarian Prime Minister Rumen Radev (BBC, 24.hu), the Turkish-owned Alfa Watan, sailing under the Togolese flag, was heading for Sulina in Romania. The Sulina branch is the navigable mouth of the Danube. The ship sank, and its crew is being searched for. The Palau-flagged Able, which was carrying grain, caught fire; its crew of 18, eleven Turkish and seven Indian sailors, were rescued by Bulgarian seamen. Radev called the attack a gross violation of the law of the sea, but did not name the attacker. According to Balkan Insight, he put it that the drones were “either Russian or Ukrainian”. One of the rescued sailors suspected a Russian mine, while the Bulgarian opposition speaks unequivocally of a Russian attack. Moscow did not react. A day earlier, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky had accused Russia of attacking a civilian ship carrying maize (BBC). According to 24.hu, that ship caught fire in the Romanian zone; one person died and one is missing. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen called the attacks on merchant ships unacceptable, and added that the exact circumstances are still being investigated.

According to a Politico article of 7 October citing five EU diplomats and officials, the ambassadors of the 27 member states are preparing, in a small circle, for how the Union should respond to a hybrid attack with multiple fatalities. The EU and NATO use the term hybrid attack for subversive acts that remain below the threshold of war. In August MIAK proposed an order of competences, in September an EU minimum standard for attribution, and on 13 August it analysed the food-price impact of the Black Sea grain shock. There are now two new elements. The first is geographical: for the first time, the attack hit traffic bound for the Danube estuary in the zone of an EU and NATO member state. The second is institutional: at next week’s European Council on 15–16 October, the heads of state or government will discuss the handling of hybrid threats.

MIAK’s reading: Hungary’s stake lies not in geopolitical commentary but in two concrete links. The first is the maritime end point of Danube freight traffic, whose risk nobody currently measures from a Hungarian perspective. The second is the weight of Hungary’s word at the EU table. According to Politico, several capitals now share the most sensitive information only in NATO format, partly because of press reports about the former Hungarian foreign minister. If Budapest does not address this trust deficit, it will be left out of discussions that also affect its own logistics routes.

Part II — Grounding in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretive framework. Under Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states owe it aid and assistance by all the means in their power. Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the solidarity clause, provides for joint action in the event of a terrorist attack or a man-made disaster, at the request of the state concerned. The two provisions are tied to different thresholds, and an attack in the exclusive economic zone on a ship sailing under a third-country flag does not automatically trigger either of them. The Union’s 2016 global strategy (EU Global Strategy) counts open and protected sea routes, critical for trade, among the Union’s own economic interests, and envisages action against hybrid threats and for maritime security in coordination with NATO. Halford J. Mackinder, the British geographer and one of the founders of geopolitics, describes in his 1904 paper that sea transport is cheap but involves fourfold handling, so a cost boundary runs between the sea route and the land route. If the risk premium of the sea route rises, this boundary shifts. Taken together, the three sources say: the security of the sea route is an EU interest, and the instruments of the response are determined by legal thresholds. The overland alternative works if the switching point is known in advance. The detailed discussion of the literature — source by source, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first makes the exposure of the Hungarian economy visible, the second is addressed to next week’s summit, and the third strengthens the precondition for Hungarian participation: allied trust.

3.1 A monthly Danube and Black Sea exposure report, with insurance-premium monitoring and a rerouting threshold (first edition within 30 days, by 6 November)

MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Transport and Investment publish a short exposure report within 30 days and update it monthly thereafter. The report should be prepared jointly with the ministry responsible for agricultural policy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, involving Danube shipping and freight-forwarding operators. The report should answer three questions. First: what share of Hungarian Danube freight traffic, by product group, reaches the Romanian sea ports, via Sulina or Constanța, and goes on from there. Second: how the premium for ship insurance covering war risk is developing in the Romanian and Bulgarian zones. Prime Minister Radev also specifically mentioned this premium when he spoke about the difficulties of shipping (24.hu). Third, and this is the core of the report: a threshold set in advance, above which the authority prepares rerouting to rail and road. According to Mackinder’s idea of a cost boundary (see 6.4.3), the sea route remains competitive as long as the combined cost of handling and sea freight does not exceed that of the direct land route. The risk premium shifts this balance, so this is what needs to be measured, not the volume of the news. MIAK’s proposal of 13 August concerned booking capacity before the harvest peak. This proposal provides its permanent measurement background: when the reserve actually has to be used. The data should be published in machine-readable form on the MG2 agricultural data platform. The rerouting order should follow the data-based railway priority matrix of KO4, while market information from diplomatic missions should be provided by the economic-diplomacy integration of KP8.

3.2 A written Hungarian position for the European Council of 15–16 October: a response-ladder map, a division of labour with NATO, a maritime element (by 13 October)

MIAK proposes that the Government, on a submission by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, set down in writing by 13 October what Hungary stands for in the summit debate on hybrid threats. The position should also be presented to the National Assembly’s committee dealing with European Union affairs. The position should consist of three elements. The first is a response-ladder map. Under it, the EU and allied instruments come into play according to their legal thresholds, building on one another. The existing Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR) authorise the rotating presidency to convene emergency consultations at the request of the state concerned. On this can build Article 222 TFEU in the case of a terrorist attack or man-made disaster, and then Article 42(7) TEU in the case of armed aggression on a member state’s territory (see 6.4.1). In NATO, consultation under Article 4 and collective defence under Article 5 are separate decisions. The map does not prejudge the identification of the perpetrator; it only sets down which finding of fact opens which instrument. The second element is the division of labour. Oana Lungescu, NATO’s former spokesperson, suggested to Politico that intelligence sharing and military deterrence should remain with NATO, while the EU should focus on the civilian response. MIAK supports this: emergency teams, rapid reallocation of EU funds and joint crisis communication, building on existing mechanisms instead of parallel new bodies. The third element is the sea route. Hungary should ask that the European security strategy expected in November examine the possibility of two things. One is a joint maritime picture, with the Romanian and Bulgarian authorities, of commercial traffic bound for EU ports. The other is a temporary EU reinsurance backstop for ship insurance covering war risk, for ships bound for Romanian and Bulgarian ports. The EU Global Strategy itself prescribes maritime security action coordinated with NATO. This is an obvious arena for KP17 issue-based coalition-building with Romania and Bulgaria, and on the national side it can be fitted into the KP7 crisis-management protocol.

3.3 A review of the handling of classified EU information and a public summary (mandate within 30 days, summary by 30 April 2027)

According to Politico, a diplomat from an eastern-flank country said that their government is reluctant to share the most sensitive information in the committee of ambassadors (Coreper), or even among the leaders. According to the paper, this mistrust was deepened by reports about the former Hungarian foreign minister as well. According to these reports, he shared the content of leader-level negotiations with his Russian counterpart. MIAK passes no judgement on these reports. It does, however, note that the mistrust directly harms Hungarian interests, because Hungary may thus be left out of the discussions where decisions are made about the region’s security. MIAK proposes that the Government, within 30 days, mandate the national authority responsible for the protection of classified information to review the period between 2022 and 2026. The review should assess how EU- and NATO-classified information was handled at the foreign ministry and in the government leadership: who had access to it, how access was logged, and where there were shortcomings. The detailed findings should be put before the National Assembly’s national security committee in a closed session, and a public, unclassified summary should be published by 30 April 2027. The review is not a criminal proceeding. If a criminal offence is suspected, only the investigating authorities and the prosecution service decide on it, and everyone is entitled to the presumption of innocence until the court’s judgment. The German example (see 6.5) shows that allies’ trust is maintained not by the absence of scandal but by the transparent handling of a leak. This is the first concrete item of the KP23 alliance credibility audit, and a practical application of KP3 transparent foreign policy and HV11 information protection.

The three proposals are linked by one principle: for the Hungarian economy, Black Sea risk is not distant news but a measurable cost. And the Hungarian EU position is only worth something if Budapest is sitting at the negotiating table when the decision is made. According to the global strategy (see 6.4.2), an open sea route is a common interest of the Union. According to the treaties (see 6.4.1), the instruments of a joint response are opened by legal thresholds. Mackinder (see 6.4.3) warns that the price of the overland detour is predictable if the switching point is known in advance.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Economy and logistics The maritime exposure of Danube traffic and the insurance premium become visible every month, and rerouting can be planned in advance Part of the data is a trade secret; rerouting too early may be more expensive than waiting
Agriculture Grain and feed exporters see the route risk in time Overland rerouting increases domestic transit, which may reignite the dispute over the 2023 import bans
Foreign policy and EU negotiations The Hungarian position is predictable, and the coalition with Romania and Bulgaria is built on an issue basis The maritime element, especially EU reinsurance, may open a budget dispute with net contributors
Defence and the alliance system The division of labour between NATO and the EU reduces overlap and confusion in decision-making If the response-ladder map is too rigid, a real incident may not fit into any single category
Domestic politics and the rule of law The review can restore partners’ trust, and the public summary is verifiable The review may look like a political settling of scores; only an independent authority, closed parliamentary oversight and the presumption of innocence can counterbalance this

The most important dilemma is the maritime element of 3.2. An EU reinsurance backstop would reduce the cost of shipping, but it would take on war risk from public money. This is defensible only if limited in time, under strict conditions and with a deductible borne by private insurers. MIAK therefore calls not for an immediate fund but for a feasibility study in the November security strategy. The proposal becomes risky if the EU backstop replaces the private insurance market and turns into a permanent subsidy.

The second dilemma is the timing of 3.3. The review concerns the period of the current government’s predecessors, so it can easily become a weapon of domestic politics. According to MIAK, the three conditions of credibility are an independent executing body, a mandate tailored to the period and not to persons, and a public summary that deals with systemic failures, not individual responsibility. The question of individual responsibility belongs to the investigating authorities and the prosecution service.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not government commitments.

  • The Danube and Black Sea exposure report. Target: first edition by 6 November 2026, monthly thereafter, with a fixed rerouting threshold and machine-readable data.
  • Monitoring the insurance premium. It is worth following every month the war-risk insurance premium for ships bound for Romanian and Bulgarian ports, and whether it has reached the rerouting threshold under 3.1.
  • A written Hungarian position for the summit. Target: by 13 October 2026, with presentation to the parliamentary committee. It is worth following whether the conclusions of the 15–16 October summit set down the division of labour between NATO and the EU, and whether they contain a maritime element.
  • The information-security review. Target: mandate by 6 November 2026, unclassified public summary by 30 April 2027.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed to the Government, in three steps. By 6 November: a monthly report on how much Hungarian goods depend on the sea route via Sulina and Constanța, how much more expensive ship insurance has become, and above what level of price increase goods must be rerouted to rail or road. By 13 October: a written position for the summit, with a response-ladder map, a division of labour between NATO and the EU, and an examination of the protection of the sea route. Within 30 days: a mandate for an independent review of the handling of classified EU information, with a public summary by spring 2027. The sources did not identify the perpetrator of the attack. The proposals therefore rest not on an assumed attacker, but on Hungarian exposure and Hungarian room for manoeuvre.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, data-drivenness and accountability are at stake here. Data-drivenness, because there is currently no measurement of the risk of the Danube route from a Hungarian perspective, and without a threshold the rerouting decision is only a hunch. Accountability, because restoring allied trust depends not on statements but on a verifiable examination of past information handling.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international press, the BBC published factual, event-centred coverage. It highlighted that Radev did not accuse Russia, and placed the attack in the context of the intensification of Russian strikes in the Black Sea. Balkan Insight put the Bulgarian domestic political dispute at the centre. The opposition accuses Radev of being pro-Russian because he did not name the attacker, and the paper also recalled the presidential election of 25 October 2026, in which the acting head of state, Iliana Iotova, is also running. Politico took an institutional angle: it analysed not the attack itself but the Union’s preparations, the dispute over overlap with NATO and the trust deficit between member states, referring to Hungary in connection with the latter. Rapporteur, Euractiv’s Brussels newsletter, published two articles: one a news summary based on the government’s statement, the other about the proposals the capitals gave the Irish presidency on countering Russian hybrid threats. Both articles are behind a subscription, and they were not publicly downloadable. Citing the Turkish Chamber of Shipping, MIAK’s foreign press monitor also recorded that since the start of the war 226 civilian ships have been attacked in the Black Sea, most of them this year. On the same day, Notes from Poland and the BBC, as well as EUobserver, presented two other sides of allied defence: the Swedish air-defence deployment and the arrest of the former head of German intelligence.

In the domestic press, according to MIAK’s press monitor, the topic did not make it among the day’s leading topics. Of the domestic articles processed, 24.hu published factual coverage based on news-agency reports. More prominently than the international papers, it highlighted that this was the first attack targeting shipping in the economic zone of NATO member Bulgaria, and that Radev also counted rising insurance premiums among the difficulties of shipping. In the business band, Portfolio framed hybrid threats from the perspective of civil protection. According to a guest article, the distance between the theatre of war and civilian life has shrunk; a security crisis today may also arrive as a drone, a cyberattack or a power cut. A news article reported on Lithuanian and Polish evacuation plans. According to MIAK’s press monitor, the left-liberal band (Telex, 444.hu, HVG, Népszava) and the conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) did not raise the Bulgarian ship attack among their leading topics on that day. The question of Danube logistics exposure and of a Hungarian position for the summit did not appear in any band.

6.2 Facts and data

The events (according to the sources):

Date Event Source
August 2026 A drone loaded with explosives is found at Leipzig airport; according to Politico, EU consultations have intensified since then Politico
5 October 2026 According to Zelensky, Russia attacked a civilian ship carrying maize; according to 24.hu, a Turkish-flagged grain carrier caught fire in the Romanian zone, one dead, one missing BBC; 24.hu
6 October 2026, approx. 3:00 Drones hit two merchant ships in Bulgaria’s exclusive economic zone BBC; Balkan Insight; 24.hu
6 October 2026 Sweden announces that from December it will deploy a Patriot air-defence system at the Rzeszów logistics hub in Poland Notes from Poland
6 October 2026 August Hanning, former president of the German Federal Intelligence Service (BND), is arrested BBC; EUobserver
7 October 2026 Meeting of the Bulgarian national security council by decree of the acting head of state Balkan Insight
15–16 October 2026 European Council, with the handling of hybrid threats on the agenda MIAK foreign press monitor; Rapporteur
25 October 2026 Presidential election in Bulgaria Balkan Insight
Early November 2026 The expected European security strategy, including the emergency security protocol proposed by von der Leyen Politico

The two ships (BBC, 24.hu): the Alfa Watan is a Turkish-owned, Togolese-flagged general cargo ship, bound for Sulina, its cargo and the number of people on board unknown; it sank. The Able is a Palau-flagged grain carrier; it caught fire, its crew of 18 were rescued, and two seriously injured were taken to the military hospital in Varna. The last known positions of the two ships were about 9 kilometres apart.

Discrepancies between the sources. Balkan Insight reports the two flags the other way round (according to it, the Palau-flagged ship sank and the Togolese one caught fire); the versions of the BBC and 24.hu agree, and the blog follows them. The BBC and 24.hu give the distance as 112 kilometres (70 miles), Balkan Insight as 70 nautical miles. The BBC and 24.hu put the number of people rescued at 18, Balkan Insight at 16. The BBC quotes Radev’s characterisation as a gross violation of the law of the sea, Balkan Insight as a gross violation of international law. Regarding the 5 October case in the Romanian zone, MIAK’s foreign press monitor reports a sinking, 24.hu a fire and one fatality.

Broader data: Bulgaria’s Black Sea exclusive economic zone is slightly more than 29 thousand square kilometres, about 6 per cent of the Black Sea (BBC). According to the Polish deputy defence minister, about 90 per cent of international aid intended for Ukraine passes through the Rzeszów hub (Notes from Poland). Article 42(7) TEU has so far been invoked only once, by France, after the 2015 Paris terrorist attacks (Politico).

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — a written position for the summit, an issue-based coalition with Romania and Bulgaria (programme point ID: KP17); linking the response-ladder map with the national crisis protocol (programme point ID: KP7); the review of the handling of classified information (programme point ID: KP23, KP3); market information from diplomatic missions (programme point ID: KP8); regional resilience (programme point ID: KP10);
  • Transport and infrastructure (programme points) — the exposure of the Danube route and the order of rail rerouting (programme point ID: KO4);
  • Agriculture (programme points) — the data basis for the route risk of grain and feed exports (programme point ID: MG2);
  • Defence (programme points) — information protection and the logistics of NATO’s eastern flank (programme point ID: HV11, HV12);
  • Public security and law enforcement (background material) — the protection of civilian critical infrastructure and disaster management as the domestic counterpart of the EU civilian response.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 TEU Article 42(7) and TFEU Article 222: mutual assistance and solidarity

The EU treaties contain two separate provisions for the case where a member state is attacked. Article 42(7) TEU addresses a situation of a military nature:

“If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.”

Article 222 TFEU, the solidarity clause, uses a different threshold:

“The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster.”

Under Article 222, assistance is given at the request of the political authorities of the member state concerned, and the member states coordinate within the Council. Applied to the present case, the two texts yield three conclusions. First: Article 42(7) is tied to armed aggression against a member state’s territory. The exclusive economic zone is not state territory, and the ships attacked were not sailing under the Bulgarian flag, so the provision does not apply automatically. None of the downloaded sources reports that Bulgaria initiated the application of any EU or NATO provision. Second: both provisions rest on the initiative of the state concerned, so the purpose of the response-ladder map (3.2) is not for Brussels to decide instead of the member state, but for it to be known in advance which finding of fact opens which instrument. Third: the scenario with multiple fatalities described by Politico may fall into the grey zone between the two thresholds. This is why the summit needs to clarify what happens if an attack cannot be unambiguously classified either as a terrorist attack or as an armed attack.

📖 Source: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Official Journal of the European Union) — Article 42(7) TEU, Article 222 TFEU

6.4.2 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action (EU Global Strategy, 2016)

The Union’s 2016 global strategy counts terrorism, hybrid threats, economic volatility and energy-security risks alike among the factors endangering citizens and the Union’s territory, and calls for the treaty commitments of mutual assistance and solidarity to be given practical content. It also speaks separately about sea routes:

“Connected to the EU’s interest in an open and fair economic system is the need for global maritime growth and security, ensuring open and protected ocean and sea routes critical for trade and access to natural resources.”

Put simply: linked to the EU’s interest in an open and fair economic system is the need for maritime growth and security, ensuring open and protected sea routes that are vital for trade and for access to natural resources. On cooperation with NATO, the document also sets down that the two organisations act against hybrid and cyber threats and for maritime security through mutually reinforcing steps. Applied to the attack on traffic bound for the Danube estuary, this means that protecting the Black Sea route is not only a matter for the coastal states, but a common interest set down in the Union’s own strategic document. The maritime element of the Hungarian position (3.2) therefore does not ask for a new EU competence, but for an instrument for a goal set down ten years ago. The strategy prescribes action coordinated with NATO, and this is also an argument for the division of labour.

📖 Source: European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)

6.4.3 Halford J. Mackinder: The Geographical Pivot of History

In his 1904 lecture to the Royal Geographical Society, the British geographer Mackinder analysed the relationship between land power and sea power. One of the lesser-known parts of the text concerns the geography of trade. According to Mackinder’s observation, sea transport is cheap per unit, but involves more handling than land transport:

“In the matter of commerce it must not be forgotten that ocean-going traffic, however relatively cheap, usually involves the fourfold handling of goods—at the factory of origin, at the export wharf, at the import wharf, and at the inland warehouse for retail distribution; whereas the continental railway truck may run direct from the exporting factory into the importing warehouse.”

Put simply: sea traffic, however cheap, usually involves fourfold handling, at the factory, at the export wharf, at the import wharf and at the inland warehouse, whereas the railway wagon can go directly from the exporting factory to the importing warehouse. From this Mackinder deduces that there is a belt around the continents. Its inner boundary runs where the combined cost of four handlings, sea freight and the coastal rail section equals the cost of two handlings and overland rail freight. In the same text he mentions that Odessa became a major port extremely quickly because of grain production. Hungarian Danube exports today also move along such a cost boundary: the route via the Danube and the sea is worthwhile as long as the overland detour is more expensive. The premium of war-risk insurance shifts precisely this balance. This is why MIAK proposes (3.1) that the government decide on rerouting not on the basis of the news, but on the basis of a threshold set in advance and tied to the risk premium.

📖 Source: Halford J. Mackinder: The Geographical Pivot of History (The Geographical Journal, 1904)

6.5 International comparison

France, 2015. Article 42(7) TEU has so far been invoked only once, by France, after the Paris terrorist attacks. Lungescu told Politico that this was a political decision by Paris, and that beyond French–Belgian investigative cooperation it did not lead to significant mutual assistance. The lesson: the treaty provision does not provide content on its own. Content comes from it being known in advance who does what. This is what the response-ladder map (3.2) aims at.

Finland. Teija Tiilikainen, director of the Helsinki-based European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats, told Politico that EU coordination is useful but does not replace national-level preparedness, such as the Finnish comprehensive security model. From a Hungarian perspective, this means that the EU summit position (3.2) and domestic exposure measurement (3.1) complement each other.

Sweden and Poland. According to Notes from Poland, from December Sweden will deploy a Patriot air-defence system and about a hundred troops to protect the Rzeszów logistics hub, taking over from the Dutch mission. The example shows that allies treat the protection of supply routes as a joint, rotational task. This logic can also be applied to Black Sea trade routes, but there the military element belongs to NATO, and the civilian and financial element to the Union.

Germany. According to the BBC and EUobserver, the federal prosecutor’s office arrested August Hanning, president of the BND between 1998 and 2005. According to the suspicion, his former office manager handed over to him, for money, some two thousand documents, partly classified, and he used some of them in connection with foreign intelligence services. Neither party has commented on the case, and the charges have not yet been examined by a court. According to EUobserver, intelligence services treat such a leak as a catastrophe, because partner services may lose their trust. The German example argues for 3.3: trust is maintained if the suspicion is clarified by independent authorities, in a transparent procedure.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP7 — Foreign-policy crisis-management protocol
  • KP8 — Economic-diplomacy integration
  • KP10 — Regional resilience-building
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Transport and infrastructure

  • KO4 — Railway development with data-based priority

Defence

  • HV11 — Strategic communication and information protection
  • HV12 — Geostrategic defence planning

Agriculture

  • MG2 — Agricultural data platform

Proposed new programme point: A Danube and Black Sea route-risk report: monthly exposure data, monitoring of the war-risk insurance premium and a threshold set in advance for overland rerouting — for the Transport and infrastructure area (with data from the Agriculture area).

Proposed new programme point: A response-ladder map for incidents of hybrid and military origin: advance, public matching of the legal thresholds of the IPCR, Article 222 TFEU, Article 42(7) TEU and NATO instruments — for the Foreign policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 7 October 2026 — topic 2; MIAK press monitor, 7 October 2026):

Knowledge-base references (books and legal sources):

  • 📖 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union — Article 42(7) TEU, Article 222 TFEU
  • 📖 European Union: Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe — A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy (2016)
  • 📖 Halford J. Mackinder: The Geographical Pivot of History (1904)

MIAK internal materials:

Supplementary public data sources (suggested for the 3.1 report):

  • the shipping statistics of the Danube Commission
  • traffic data of the Romanian port authorities (Constanța, Sulina)
  • the foreign-trade and transport-sector data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH), broken down by mode of transport
  • the statement of the Bulgarian national security council of 7 October

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