Part I — Situation overview

On the evening of 5 October 2026 the Budapest Metropolitan Court announced in a statement that it had terminated the administrative lawsuit, that is, the court procedure concerning a public-law relationship, brought by László Windisch, president of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), against Ferenc Pál Biró, president of the Integrity Authority. The ÁSZ is the financial and economic audit body of the National Assembly. On 16 June Windisch asked the court to terminate Biró’s legal relationship as president, because on 5 June the Central Investigative Chief Prosecutor’s Office had indicted him for breach of trust causing particularly large financial loss, abuse of office and forgery of public documents. The court did not examine the claim on its merits. According to the statement, the ground for exclusion had already arisen at the point of suspicion, since Biró was questioned as a suspect on 16 January and 13 February 2025. The president of the ÁSZ learned of this from the written information of the Office of the Prosecutor General by 27 February 2025 at the latest, and from that point he had 90 days to file the claim. Windisch interpreted the rule to mean that the indictment, as a new procedural turning point, reopens the possibility. According to the court, this is an erroneous interpretation of the law; the criminal proceedings must be treated as a single whole (24.hu, Index). The reports did not say whether the order is final. Biró denies the charges and calls the proceedings politically motivated. Only the criminal court may decide on his guilt; an indictment is a prosecutorial step, not a judgment.

On the same day Windisch wrote a letter to President of the Republic András Baka. He objected that Prime Minister Péter Magyar was accusing the ÁSZ on social media, without foundation, of abetting illegal party financing and the plundering of the MNB foundations. The president of the ÁSZ asked the head of state to exercise his constitutional powers and to assert his authority so that the executive respects the autonomy of the institutions independent of it (Telex, 444.hu). MIAK analysed the institutional consequences of the indictment in June, the initiation of the dismissal on 17 June, and the Government’s announcement of a review of the ÁSZ in July. The new fact is that the case was decided not on its merits but on the interpretation of a deadline.

MIAK’s reading: the fault lies not in one person’s delay but in the structure of the rule. The ground for removal arises with a questioning as a suspect, while the filing of a lawsuit depends on the discretion of a single person, without a mandatory decision or public reasons. The system can thus be too strict and too lenient at the same time. Mere suspicion is enough to remove the head of an independent control body, yet if the person entitled to act waits, the indicted head may remain in office. The letter is the other face of the same gap: there is no institutional forum for disputes between the independent bodies and the Government, so social media posts and letters to the head of state take its place.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

The topic receives an interpretive framework from three authors. Joseph Raz, the legal philosopher who taught at Oxford and one of the defining exponents of the formal conception of the rule of law, writes in his book The Authority of Law that the law can guide behaviour only if it is clear and knowable in advance. This also applies to power-conferring rules, not only to prohibitions binding citizens. Robert Klitgaard, the American economist and researcher of anti-corruption strategies, analyses the experience of the Hong Kong anti-corruption commission in his work Controlling Corruption. Among these lessons he highlights that a control body, too, needs a credible, independent system for handling complaints against it. Susan Rose-Ackerman, professor of law and economics at Yale University, warns in her book Corruption and Government that an anti-corruption office can itself become an instrument of abuse. She therefore proposes external oversight, an independent judiciary and accountability to the legislature, and regards the financial oversight of the executive as one of parliament’s basic tasks. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable steps. The first two require legislative amendments, which the National Assembly can adopt on a Government proposal or an MP’s motion. The third is partly parliamentary practice and partly a voluntary commitment. None of the proposals is aimed at the pending case: the rules should apply only to events occurring after their entry into force, and the present case should continue under the law in force.

3.1 Tiered triggering grounds and event-linked deadlines for the heads of the Integrity Authority (legislative proposal by 15 December 2026)

Under Section 39(4) of Act XXVII of 2022 on the Integrity Authority, the president of the ÁSZ may bring a lawsuit if the conditions for the president’s appointment no longer exist. Under Section 24(2) of Act CVII of 2019 on bodies with special legal status (Küt.), a public-service relationship may not be established with a person who is subject to criminal proceedings for certain offences, including offences against official duty. Section 39 itself contains no deadline for bringing a claim; it only refers to the rules on public-service lawsuits. The court had to derive the 90-day deadline and its starting point. MIAK proposes three stages, each linked to an objective event written into the text of the law. At the point of suspicion, the head is obliged to report the proceedings within eight days to the president of the ÁSZ and to the Eligibility Committee. This is the body that conducts the application procedure and examines the candidates’ suitability. From then on the head may not act in official matters connected with his own case. At indictment, the president of the ÁSZ is obliged to decide within 30 days, in writing and with public reasons: either he brings a lawsuit to terminate the legal relationship, or he explains why not. The law should state that the indictment opens a new deadline. Upon final conviction, the mandate ends by operation of law. According to Raz’s proposition (see 6.4.1), a power-conferring rule must also be clear, otherwise it misleads even those who want to follow it.

3.2 A uniform minimum removal rule for the heads of independent bodies (inventory by 15 January 2027, framework rule with impact assessment by 30 June 2027)

The Integrity Authority is only one of the independent bodies. MIAK proposes that the Ministry of Justice publish, by 15 January 2027, an inventory of the removal rules for the heads of independent bodies. These include, for example, the Integrity Authority, the Hungarian Competition Authority, the National Media and Infocommunications Authority and the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights. The inventory should show, body by body, what the ground for removal is, who may initiate it, when the deadline starts, who decides, and whether there is a legal remedy. Building on this, a framework rule should be drawn up that lays down the elements of point 3.1 as a minimum. These are: an objective, event-linked triggering ground, a mandatory and reasoned decision on initiation, a court decision on termination, and a legal remedy with suspensive effect. The framework rule would not override the constitutional or cardinal-law rules of individual bodies; it would only fill in the missing elements. The public impact assessment under programme point I3 should also assess for how many bodies a rule on the start of the deadline is missing today. According to Klitgaard’s framework (see 6.4.2), a control body is credible if complaints against it are also handled by an independent, predictable order. In the independent corruption investigation office proposed in programme point A10, this rule must be built in from the outset.

3.3 A parliamentary channel for disputes between the Government and the independent control bodies (in the 2026 autumn session)

Under Article 9(1) of the Fundamental Law, the President of the Republic safeguards the democratic functioning of the state organisation, but he is not the Prime Minister’s superior. He has no power by which he could restrict the head of government’s statements. The head of state may speak out and may initiate consultation, but these are political, not legal, instruments. The ÁSZ is an organ of the National Assembly and reports to it, so the natural place for the dispute is parliament. MIAK proposes three steps. First: the president of the ÁSZ should present the schedule of the campaign-finance investigation and the expected date of its conclusion before the competent committee of the National Assembly, in a public sitting. The Government’s representative should set out its objections in the same forum. Second: for its investigations of high public interest, the ÁSZ should publish the investigation stages, so that the answer to a question of the “how long will it stay silent” type can be a date, not a letter. Third: members of the Government should commit not to announce in advance the outcome of a pending audit investigation or criminal proceedings. They may criticise the functioning of the control body, but not its findings. The right to criticise also belongs to the executive. The ÁSZ audits and reports; it cannot impose obligations, and the Government cannot instruct the ÁSZ. Rose-Ackerman (see 6.4.3) regards the oversight of the executive’s finances as a basic task of the legislature. The institutional independence measurement of programme point A6 can also record how this channel functions.

The three proposals are bound together by one principle: holding the heads of independent bodies to account and protecting them are two sides of the same rule. If the rule is clear, neither suspicion nor waiting can become a political instrument. If the dispute has a public, parliamentary forum, criticism does not turn into pressure, and defence does not turn into a letter of complaint.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Legal certainty The start of the deadline can be read from the text of the law, not from a court’s derivation The tiered model is more complex than the current single ground for exclusion and may give rise to transitional disputes of interpretation
Presumption of innocence Mere suspicion does not automatically lead to removal, only to exclusion on grounds of conflict of interest in the cases concerned Years may pass between indictment and final judgment, during which an indicted head may run a control body
Anti-corruption institutions A mandatory, publicly reasoned decision on initiation; silence cannot be a strategy The pressure of a mandatory decision may turn the president of the ÁSZ into a political flashpoint
EU funds The stability of the leadership of the authority created within the conditionality procedure becomes more predictable If the amendment appears tailored to an individual case, the EU assessment may read it as a weakening of the authority’s independence
Relationship between the Government and the ÁSZ The dispute moves to a public, documented parliamentary forum The committee hearing may itself become a political stage, and under the current two-thirds majority it may appear one-sided

The most important question to weigh is the period between indictment and final judgment. If the rule prescribed automatic suspension here, a prosecutorial decision alone could remove the head of an independent control body. Depending on the relationship between the executive of the day and the prosecution service, this could become a weapon. If, however, it prescribes nothing, the current situation remains. MIAK therefore opts for a mandatory, reasoned decision reviewed by a court: after the indictment someone must decide publicly within a deadline, and the court rules on termination.

The parliamentary channel works if both sides take it seriously. If, alongside the hearing, the Government continues to announce preliminary findings, or the ÁSZ provides no schedule, the forum remains an empty formality. That is why MIAK proposes that the commitments be public and enforceable.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK suggests the following key performance indicators (KPIs). These are suggested indicators, not commitments of the Government or of parliament.

  • Submission of the amendment of the Act on the Integrity Authority. Target: by 15 December 2026, a proposal containing tiered triggering grounds and event-linked deadlines is before the National Assembly.
  • Inventory of the removal rules of independent bodies. Target: a public, body-by-body table by 15 January 2027. It is worth following for how many bodies an unambiguous rule on the start of the deadline is missing.
  • A public schedule for the campaign-finance investigation. Target: by the end of 2026 the ÁSZ publishes the stages of the investigation, and makes its report public within the statutory one-year deadline.
  • A public parliamentary hearing on the dispute between the Government and the ÁSZ. Target: at least one such committee sitting, with minutes, in the 2026 autumn session.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is addressed primarily to the National Assembly and the Government. By 15 December 2026 an amendment of the Act on the Integrity Authority should be before parliament that attaches separate consequences and deadlines, written into the text of the law, to suspicion, indictment and final judgment. In the first half of 2027 a uniform minimum rule for the heads of all independent bodies should be built on it. From the ÁSZ, MIAK asks for a public investigation schedule and a parliamentary hearing; from members of the Government, it asks that they not announce in advance the outcome of pending investigations. It does not expect the President of the Republic to take any step for which the Fundamental Law grants no power.

Of MIAK’s foundational values, accountability and transparency are engaged here. Accountability, because today whether an indicted head stays in office has depended on one person’s interpretation of a deadline. The head of a control body must render account, and so must the person who may initiate his removal. Transparency, because today the decision to initiate, or not to initiate, is not public, and the dispute between the Government and the ÁSZ is conducted in social media posts and letters, not in a documented forum.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band, HVG’s headline and lead put the delay at the centre: the president of the ÁSZ waited until the indictment and thereby “ran out of time by a good year”. The outlet detailed that, according to the court, the ground for exclusion arose not with the indictment but with the questioning as a suspect. Telex set out the legal reasoning of the court’s statement and also recalled details of the indictment. In a separate article, built on the text of the letter, it wrote that the president of the ÁSZ was complaining about the Prime Minister’s constant criticism. 444.hu also quoted Ferenc Biró’s earlier reaction, according to which Windisch is “one of the last men of the fallen power”. In its article on the letter it noted that the president of the ÁSZ is, in private life, the partner of the Prime Minister’s former wife, and recalled the ÁSZ’s July response to the announcement of the review. Népszava published both topics as factual, MTI-based news, and also mentioned the private relationship.

In the mainstream band, 24.hu set out the court’s statement in detail, and in its article on the letter it added a bracketed editorial note to Windisch’s claim. According to the outlet, the MNB foundations affair was in fact uncovered by the independent press. Index’s headline was built on the contrast between substance and procedure: the authority’s president does not meet the statutory conditions, yet may stay. At one point the article’s text spoke of a dismissal of the claim, whereas the court terminated the lawsuit and made no decision on the merits. In the business press, Portfolio presented the letter as a document published on the ÁSZ’s website, and recalled the audit office’s statement of 30 September.

In the sources processed by MIAK, the outlets of the conservative band did not cover the topic on this day. Common to the whole spectrum is that the termination of the lawsuit was framed as Windisch’s personal omission, and the letter as a personal conflict between the Government and the ÁSZ. None of the outlets wrote that the law itself does not fix the deadline and its starting point.

6.2 Facts and data

Timeline of the case:

Date Event Source
16 January and 13 February 2025 Ferenc Pál Biró questioned as a suspect Statement of the Budapest Metropolitan Court (24.hu, Index)
5 and 27 February 2025 The president of the ÁSZ requests information; the criminal-law deputy of the Office of the Prosecutor General informs him in detail in writing Statement of the Budapest Metropolitan Court (24.hu, Index)
5 June 2026 The Central Investigative Chief Prosecutor’s Office files an indictment (announced on 9 June) Telex, Index
16 June 2026 The claim of the president of the ÁSZ before the Budapest Metropolitan Court 24.hu, Telex
July 2026 The Prime Minister announces a full review of the functioning of the ÁSZ; the ÁSZ rejects it 444.hu, Portfolio
September 2026 Biró files a counter-application: in his view the claim jeopardises bringing home EU funds 444.hu, HVG
30 September 2026 In a statement, the ÁSZ rejects the Prime Minister’s criticism Portfolio
5 October 2026 The Budapest Metropolitan Court terminates the lawsuit as filed out of time; the president of the ÁSZ writes a letter to the President of the Republic 24.hu, Telex, 444.hu

The relevant rules in force:

Rule Content Legal source
Appointment The president of the Integrity Authority is appointed by the President of the Republic on the proposal of the president of the ÁSZ for six years, and may not be reappointed Act XXVII of 2022, Section 35(1)
Applicable status rule The president is in a public-service relationship, governed by the rules of the Küt. in the absence of derogations Act XXVII of 2022, Section 35(3)
Ground for exclusion A public-service relationship may not be established with a person subject to criminal proceedings for specified offences, including offences against official duty Act CVII of 2019, Section 24(2)
Right to bring a lawsuit The president of the ÁSZ may bring a lawsuit if the Eligibility Committee initiates it, or if the conditions for appointment no longer exist Act XXVII of 2022, Section 39(4)
Procedure Rules on public-service lawsuits; the Budapest Metropolitan Court has exclusive jurisdiction; the court decides within sixty days Act XXVII of 2022, Section 39(6)
Legal remedy An appeal with suspensive effect lies against a judgment ordering termination Act XXVII of 2022, Section 39(7)
Mandatory initiation In the case of a conflict of interest or a false asset declaration, the Eligibility Committee is obliged to initiate termination; there is no such obligation in the case of criminal proceedings Act XXVII of 2022, Sections 43–44

The legislative texts are taken from the National Legislation Database as in force when downloaded on 6 October 2026. The 90-day deadline for bringing a claim is mentioned by the court’s statement and by press reports; Section 39 of the Act on the Integrity Authority does not contain it.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — measuring the functioning of checks and balances, including the removal rules for the heads of independent bodies (programme point ID: A6); the accountability rules of the independent corruption investigation office (programme point ID: A10); the adoption of international institutional standards (programme point ID: A14);
  • Justice (programme points) — the court closed the lawsuit without examining the merits, on the basis of the interpretation of a deadline; a public impact assessment before the amendment (programme point ID: I3). The prosecution service is an independent constitutional organ, not part of the judicial branch of the courts;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the grounds for exclusion from the public-service relationship of bodies with special legal status and the publicity of employer decisions;
  • Legal foundations (background material) — the ÁSZ audits, it does not impose obligations; the President of the Republic is not a governmental actor and is not the Prime Minister’s superior; an indictment is not a finding of guilt.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

In the chapter on the rule of law, Raz derives several principles from the basic idea that the law must be capable of guiding behaviour. According to the first principle, laws should be prospective, public and clear. An ambiguous, vague or imprecise rule misleads at least some of those who want to follow it. Raz specifically stresses that the principles of the rule of law apply not only to prohibitions binding citizens. Power-conferring rules must also comply with them, because they too seek to guide behaviour. In the Hungarian case, the president of the ÁSZ’s right to bring a lawsuit is precisely such a power-conferring rule. The law does not say which event starts the deadline, so the person entitled followed his own interpretation, and the court another. Within Raz’s framework, this is not a simple omission but a lack of clarity in the rule. The event-linked deadline of point 3.1 remedies this. Because of the legal status of the source, the text is a paraphrase.

📖 Source: Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law

6.4.2 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

At the end of the chapter analysing the creation and functioning of Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against Corruption, Klitgaard summarises a 1983 conference paper by Peter Williams, a former head of the commission. Williams listed six conditions for a country that wants to set up an independent anti-corruption office. The office should be independent of political and executive power, its staff should visibly and lastingly represent the highest integrity, and there should be a credible, independent system for handling complaints against the office. Klitgaard also shows that in Hong Kong a separate complaints committee received complaints against the commission’s staff and made recommendations on sanctions. The lesson for the Hungarian case: the credibility of a control body also depends on whether the case of its own head is handled by a predictable, independent order. If that order depends on the discretion of a single entitled person and on a disputed deadline, it also weakens the authority’s credibility. The minimum rule of point 3.2 generalises this condition. Because of the legal status of the source, the text is a paraphrase.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.3 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In the section on independent anti-corruption offices, Rose-Ackerman writes that a control body with broad powers can itself become an instrument for acting against political opponents. It must therefore be counterbalanced by external oversight bodies and an independent judiciary, and it is advisable for it to report not to the head of the executive but to the legislature, as the American audit office does. In a subsequent section the author stresses the legislature’s ongoing role of financial oversight: in Westminster systems this is performed by public accounts committees, often chaired by an opposition MP. Applied to the Hungarian situation: the ÁSZ is also constitutionally an organ of the National Assembly. The natural forum for the dispute between the Government and the ÁSZ is therefore a parliamentary committee hearing, not social media and not a letter to the head of state. This is what point 3.3 proposes. Because of the legal status of the source, the text is a paraphrase.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.5 International comparison

The best-known international standard on the status of the heads of anti-corruption agencies is the 2012 Jakarta Statement. It was adopted by heads of anti-corruption agencies and experts with the involvement of the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Under it, the head of an agency may be removed only through a procedure laid down by law. The procedure must be equivalent to the rules for removing a specially protected independent office-holder, such as the president of the supreme court. The same document also prescribes internal and external accountability: the agency must operate according to clear internal rules and must submit itself to external mechanisms that prevent the abuse of power. The Integrity Authority is not a classic investigating agency, but the principles of the statement can be applied to it by analogy.

For audit offices, the standard is set by the 2007 Mexico Declaration of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). Under its second principle, the law must determine the conditions for the appointment, removal and retirement of the head of the audit institution. The removal procedure should ensure independence from the executive, and the mandate should be sufficiently long and fixed to allow the head to carry out his work without fear of retaliation. The Hungarian case is instructive in both directions. The independence of the president of the ÁSZ is protected by the Fundamental Law, since the National Assembly elects him by a two-thirds majority for twelve years. The removal decision that depends on him, however, has no fixed timetable in Hungarian law that would provide predictability in line with international standards. Points 3.1 and 3.2 close this gap.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A10 — Independent Corruption Investigation Office (CPIB model)
  • A14 — International institutional participation and accountability

Justice

  • I3 — Legislative impact assessment

Proposed new programme point: A uniform, event-linked minimum removal rule for the heads of independent bodies — tiered triggering grounds, a mandatory and reasoned decision on initiation, a start of the deadline fixed in law — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 6 October 2026 — topic 2):

Legal sources:

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 Joseph Raz: The Authority of Law
  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A10, A14)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I3)
  • MIAK policy area: Public administration and e-government (background material)
  • MIAK legal foundations: typical conceptual errors concerning the branches of power and institutional competences (background material)
  • MIAK press monitor, 6 October 2026 — topic 2, score: 82/100

Supplementary public data sources:

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