Part I — Situation overview

On 29 September 2026 the Brussels EU affairs portal formerly known as Euractiv, relaunched at the end of September under the name Rapporteur, reported as an exclusive that the European Commission is proposing a radical decision-making overhaul for an enlarged Union. According to the subheading, the “consensus” model would be scrapped in the areas of enlargement, sanctions and defence, so that decisions can be made faster. The text of the article was not publicly available, so MIAK knows no more about the legal construction, timing and details of the proposal than what the headline and subheading state. One day earlier, on 28 September, Kaja Kallas, the Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, called it “regrettable” at the meeting of defence ministers in Brussels, according to EUobserver’s report, that last week the Union removed two Russian oligarchs from the sanctions list. Lithuanian Defence Minister Robertas Kaunas spoke of a “step back”. Kallas announced that the 22nd Russia sanctions package, targeting the military-industrial complex and Russian finances, is due on 12 October.

The background is well known. According to EUobserver’s report of 22 September, France secured the delisting of metals billionaire Alisher Usmanov by risking the expiry of the entire list of some 3,000 entries. Part of the bargain was the delisting of banker Mikhail Fridman at Luxembourg’s request, and the fixing of the remaining list for three years at the wish of the other member states. According to the subheading of a Rapporteur background analysis of 28 September, there is growing concern that sanctions negotiations are turning into horse-trading between national interests. This is the immediate backdrop to the reform debate. For Hungary the question is not theoretical. According to MIAK’s analysis of 3 September, the new Government, too, blocked Ukraine’s 2nd and 3rd accession clusters, citing the minority rights of Hungarians in Transcarpathia. MIAK has earlier proposed public justification of the veto, issue-based coalition-building and decoupling sanctions renewal from delisting requests. The new question is different: what should Budapest do if the rule itself is to be changed?

MIAK’s reading: in the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), changing the rule requires a unanimous decision of the European Council, which means it cannot come about without the consent of the Hungarian prime minister. This moment is a rare bargaining position that should be wasted neither on a general rejection nor on an unconditional yes. The three areas differ both legally and in terms of interests, so the right Hungarian answer differs area by area.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretative framework. Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) lays down at once the general rule of unanimity, the possibility of standing aside without blocking, and the route by which the European Council can move to qualified majority by a unanimous decision. At the same time, the treaty expressly excludes decisions having military or defence implications from this. Kristian L. Nielsen, a researcher at Copenhagen Business School and the University of Tartu, drawing on the literature in his study EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap (2013), finds that the insistence on consensus has often resulted in member states being collectively reluctant to use existing EU instruments purposefully. This is the scholarly formulation of the Commission’s reform argument. Henry Kissinger, former US National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, shows the two faces of consensus in Diplomacy (1994). In the Concert of Europe after 1815, the obligation of joint action in practice gave the weaker Austria a veto over the adventures of its powerful Russian ally. The collective sanctions of the interwar League of Nations, by contrast, in his view inevitably reflected the lowest common denominator. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first breaks down Hungary’s negotiating mandate by area, the second makes the alternative to the veto the default instrument, and the third sets out the conditions to which Hungary can tie the switch.

3.1 A public Hungarian negotiating mandate differentiated by area (before the mid-October European Council)

MIAK proposes that before the October European Council meeting the Government publish how it relates to the decision-making reform, broken down by area. Beforehand, it should consult the National Assembly’s Committee on European Affairs. Sanctions: Hungary should support the European Council, using the passerelle clause in Article 31(3) TEU, moving the adoption and renewal of restrictive measures to qualified majority. The passerelle clause means a unanimous European Council decision without treaty amendment. The emergency brake, that is, the right under Article 31(2) to object on vital, stated reasons of national policy, should be retained. Enlargement: the unanimity of the final accession decision under Article 49 and ratification by the member states cannot be overridden by the passerelle clauses, and the Government should set this down as its starting point. At the intermediate steps of the negotiations (opening and closing clusters), Hungary should accept majority decisions only under the conditions of 3.3. Defence: Article 31(4) and Article 48(7) exclude decisions having military or defence implications from the scope of the passerelle clauses. Here unanimity can be ended only by ordinary treaty revision, which every member state, including the National Assembly, must approve. The Government should say this in advance, so that the debate does not get stuck on the most sensitive area. The step is a practical application of the KP19 institutional reform position and of KP3 transparent foreign policy. According to Kissinger’s proposition (see 6.4.3), consensus protects where the vital interest of the weaker party is at stake, and does harm where collective action is needed.

3.2 Constructive abstention as the default instrument, with the 12 October sanctions package as the first test

The treaty already offers an instrument instead of blocking. Under Article 31(1) TEU, an abstaining member state may qualify its abstention by making a formal declaration. In that case it is not obliged to apply the decision, but accepts that the decision commits the Union. The decision fails only if those making such a declaration represent at least one third of the member states and of the Union’s population. MIAK proposes that the Government set down in a written protocol that where the Hungarian position differs in the common foreign and security policy, the default instrument is constructive abstention. It should use the veto only if a vital interest under 3.1 is at stake, and justify this publicly, item by item. The first test is the decision on the 22nd sanctions package on 12 October. Before the decision, the Government should signal that it is not linking any other dossier to it, and that if it disagrees with an element, it will abstain. The protocol gives a measurable basis to the KP23 alliance credibility audit: how many of the dissenting Hungarian positions appeared as abstentions and how many as blocks. According to Nielsen’s argument (see 6.4.2), the Union’s credibility is eroded by the lack of delivery. Whoever abstains does not obstruct delivery, yet preserves their own position. This may be a stronger argument against the rule change than any protest, because it refutes the Commission’s reform argument by showing that unanimity can work.

MIAK proposes that the Government attach three conditions to the switch to qualified majority, and send them in writing to the rotating presidency and to the Commission. The first is raising the minority-protection standard to EU level. Today Hungary represents the rights of the Hungarian community in Transcarpathia with a bilateral veto. Under majority decision-making this instrument would disappear. The condition for consent is therefore that respect for the rights of national minorities become a uniform, measurable basic condition in the negotiating framework of every candidate country, and that the Commission assess it separately in its annual country reports. In this way the Hungarian interest turns from one member state’s demand into a common EU rule. The second is retaining and clarifying the emergency brake: the objection under Article 31(2) should also apply to matters newly brought under majority decision-making, together with the High Representative’s obligation to mediate. The third is a political review: simultaneously with the decision making the switch, the European Council should undertake to evaluate the experience of the switch after three years, on the basis of a public report. Following the logic of KP17 issue-based coalition-building, the package of conditions is worth representing jointly with other member states that also have national minorities or are concerned about their veto power. The TEU (see 6.4.1) offers a legal foothold for all three conditions.

A single principle links the three proposals: veto power is not an end but a means, and the right question is what it protects in which area. On sanctions, the Hungarian veto has in recent years consumed more credibility than the interests it protected. On enlargement it protects a tangible national interest, which must be carried over into a common rule. And in defence the treaty already sides with the Hungarian position.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Foreign policy and alliance credibility The differentiated, public mandate and the yes on sanctions are a visible sign of a break with the earlier veto practice; Hungary becomes a shaper of the reform debate, not an obstacle to it The Commission and the large member states may read the conditions as stalling; if the reform is implemented without Hungarian consent, in narrower cooperation, Budapest will be left out of it
Pursuit of national interests (minority protection) The uniform EU minority-protection standard would apply to every candidate, and the Hungarian demand would not appear as a bilateral bargain If the standard is general and not measurable, the Hungarian side loses the veto but gets no meaningful guarantee
Defence and sovereignty Stating the treaty exclusion clarifies that unanimity remains in military decisions Reform pressure diverted towards joint procurement and defence-industrial programmes may arrive in another form, with less Hungarian influence
Economy More predictable sanctions decision-making reduces the economic risk of crises around the list that threaten its expiry With majority sanctions decisions, Hungary could not stop on its own even measures affecting its energy supply; the emergency brake offsets this only partially
Domestic politics and democratic control Prior involvement of the National Assembly and a public mandate make the Government’s EU bargaining verifiable The domestic debate about losing veto power can easily turn into a sovereignty issue and crowd out area-by-area deliberation

The main question to weigh is whether saying yes on sanctions gives away too much. MIAK’s answer: the value of the sanctions veto has steadily declined over the recent period. According to the Foreign policy background material, because of frequent use of the veto, the other member states have steered more and more decisions into informal or narrower consultations from which Hungary was left out. The proposal becomes risky if the conditions of 3.3 remain on paper and the Government gives way unconditionally on the intermediate steps of enlargement as well. The other risk is that in the defence area the Commission looks for a different legal route rather than the passerelle clause. No position can be taken on this without knowing the text of the proposal, so the Government should ask for a written presentation of the legal construction before committing to anything.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four key performance indicators (KPIs) which will show after 6, 12 and 24 months whether the proposals have taken effect:

  • A public mandate broken down by area: it is worth following whether the Government’s written position, broken down into sanctions, enlargement and defence, appears before the mid-October European Council, and whether there was prior consultation with the parliamentary committee.
  • The 12 October sanctions package: it is worth following whether the 22nd package is adopted on the planned date, without postponement, and whether the Hungarian vote is accompanied by a public justification, without conditions linked to other dossiers.
  • The ratio of abstentions to blocks: the proposed target is that by the end of 2027, in common foreign and security policy decisions, at least two thirds of dissenting Hungarian positions appear as constructive abstention and not as blocking. The measurement can be carried out by the first credibility audit under KP23.
  • An EU minority-protection standard: the proposed target is that the Commission’s 2027 enlargement country reports assess the rights of national minorities for every candidate according to a uniform, measurable set of criteria.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks that the Government respond to the Commission’s decision-making reform not with a single yes or no, but area by area. On sanctions it should support qualified majority, while retaining the emergency brake. On enlargement it should accept it only if minority protection becomes a uniform EU condition. And in defence it should state that under the treaty the switch is possible only through treaty amendment. In the meantime it should replace the veto with constructive abstention, first with the 12 October sanctions package. Hungary’s consent is now a rare bargaining position, and it is worth the most if it is tied to concrete, public conditions.

Two of MIAK’s foundational values are affected. Accountability, because the veto has so far been an instrument whose costs — isolation, exclusion from narrower consultations — the public did not see. The area-by-area mandate and the abstention protocol tie these decisions to justification and to a measurable indicator. Ideology-free thinking, because the debate easily gets simplified into a battle between pro-sovereignty and pro-integration camps. MIAK’s proposal instead examines which rule protects which concrete Hungarian interest, and where it costs more than it yields.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the international press the two threads appeared with different emphases. Rapporteur framed the decision-making reform as exclusive institutional news, from the angle of efficiency: according to the subheading, the aim is to simplify decisions on enlargement, sanctions and defence. The outlet’s background analysis of 28 September stressed the fatigue of the sanctions regime, that is, that the easy targets have run out and negotiations are becoming an exchange of national interests. Both articles could be verified only at the level of headline and subheading. EUobserver chose a security-policy framing. It placed Kallas’s criticism alongside the multiplying sabotage operations in Europe and the failure of the German–Russian consultation at the UN. Its article of 22 September openly wrote that France had caused lasting damage to EU sanctions for its own interest. AP approached from the angle of differentiated forms of membership. Its analysis of the associate membership offered to Canada points to the broader debate in which the pre-enlargement reform is taking place; the article could be verified only at headline level. None of the sources in the international band examined how the reform would affect those member states that use the veto for a concrete national interest not related to Russia, such as minority protection.

In the domestic band, the topic did not make it among the leading news items in MIAK’s press monitoring today. The left-liberal (Telex, 444.hu, Népszava, HVG), the public-affairs (24.hu, Index, ATV), the economic (Portfolio) and the conservative band close to the former governing parties (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) brought other topics in the day’s policy focus. On sanctions, domestic attention was directed at the review of OTP’s presence in Russia. This absence is itself instructive: the debate on the future of Hungary’s veto power has not even begun in the domestic public sphere, while the European Council may discuss it in a matter of weeks.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
The Commission’s planned reform scrapping the “consensus” model in the areas of enlargement, sanctions and defence Rapporteur, 29 September 2026 (headline and subheading)
Kallas’s statement on the delisting of the two oligarchs “regrettable”; made at the meeting of defence ministers EUobserver, 28 September 2026
Planned date of the 22nd Russia sanctions package 12 October 2026 EUobserver, 28 September 2026
The delisted persons Alisher Usmanov (at France’s request), Mikhail Fridman (at Luxembourg’s request) EUobserver, 22 September 2026
Fixing of the remaining list for three years EUobserver, 22 September 2026
Size of the list some 3,000 persons and entities EUobserver, 22 September 2026
Unanimity in the CFSP general rule TEU Article 31(1)
Limit of constructive abstention the decision fails if those making the declaration represent at least one third of the member states and of the population TEU Article 31(1)
Passerelle clause in the CFSP by unanimous European Council decision; does not apply to military and defence decisions TEU Article 31(3)–(4)
General passerelle clause any national parliament can prevent it by objecting within six months; the consent of the European Parliament is required; not applicable to defence decisions TEU Article 48(7)
Qualified majority at least 55% of member states (at least 15), representing at least 65% of the EU population; a blocking minority requires at least four member states TEU Article 16(4)
Admission of a new member unanimous decision of the Council and ratification by all member states TEU Article 49

Two data points require a separate note. One is the legal route of the Commission’s proposal: from the headline and subheading it cannot be known whether the Commission would build on the passerelle clauses or on treaty amendment, and whether “enlargement” also covers the intermediate negotiating steps or the final accession decision. According to the treaty text, the passerelle clauses cannot be applied to the defence area. The other is the set of monitored dates: the dates of the mid-October European Council and of the Commission’s pre-enlargement policy review were recorded by MIAK’s foreign press monitor; MIAK has not verified them against an official agenda by the time this article was finalised.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Foreign policy (programme points) — the centre of gravity of the topic: KP19 (international institutional reform position) is the mandate differentiated by area, KP17 (issue-based coalition-building in the EU) is the joint representation of the package of conditions, KP23 (alliance credibility audit) is the measurement of the ratio of abstentions to blocks, and KP3 (transparent foreign policy) is the public mandate and justification;
  • Defence (programme points) — HV4 (EU defence industrial base and joint procurement) is affected because reform of defence decision-making also influences the governance of joint procurement and defence-industrial programmes, while under the treaty the unanimity of military decisions can change only through treaty amendment;
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — A14 (participation in international institutions and accountability) provides the principle of publicity of the Hungarian voting position and its justification, which proposals 3.1 and 3.2 apply to EU Council decisions;
  • Economy (background material) — the predictability of sanctions decision-making and the handling of measures affecting energy supply also represent an economic risk, which retaining the emergency brake mitigates.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 The Treaty on European Union (TEU)

Article 31(1) lays down the general rule: decisions in the common foreign and security policy are taken by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously. The same paragraph provides the possibility of constructive abstention:

“In that case, the Member State concerned shall not be obliged to apply the decision, but shall accept that the decision commits the Union.”

Paragraph (2) lists the cases in which qualified majority already applies today, and it also contains the emergency brake: if a member state opposes the decision for vital and stated reasons of national policy, a vote is not taken, and the matter may ultimately be referred to the European Council for a unanimous decision. Paragraph (3) is the passerelle clause: the European Council may, by unanimous decision, extend qualified majority decision-making to other cases. Paragraph (4), however, states that paragraphs (2) and (3) do not apply to decisions having military or defence implications. Article 42(4) separately prescribes unanimity for decisions of the common security and defence policy. The general passerelle clause in Article 48(7) likewise excludes defence decisions. In addition, it gives any national parliament, including the National Assembly, six months to prevent the switch by objecting. Under Article 49, the Council decides unanimously on the admission of a new member, and the accession agreement must be ratified by all member states. This is why proposal 3.1 separates the three areas: on sanctions the treaty leaves the path open, on defence it closes it, and at the final step of enlargement no change can be achieved even with a passerelle clause. Proposals 3.2 and 3.3 build on two instruments the treaty already has: abstention and the emergency brake. The text is an official source of law and can therefore be quoted verbatim.

📖 Source: European Union: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

6.4.2 Kristian L. Nielsen: EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap

In his study published in the Journal of Contemporary European Research, Nielsen starts from a concept of the British political scientist Christopher Hill: the capability-expectations gap describes how the Union promises, and elicits from others, more action than it is able to deliver. Citing the work of Norwegian researcher Asle Toje, he finds one of the causes of the gap in decision-making:

“[…] the insistence on consensus has often meant a collective reluctance to using the resources actually available in a purposeful way, and hence meeting the expectations held of the EU.”

In other words: the insistence on consensus has often meant that member states were collectively reluctant to use the resources actually available purposefully, and thus to meet the expectations placed on the Union. Using the example of the Darfur crisis, the study also describes how internal expectations gradually declined until military action was taken off the agenda for lack of consensus. In this framework, the delisting of 22 September is not an isolated scandal but a symptom of the gap: the force of an existing instrument was reduced by an internal bargain. MIAK does not draw the conclusion from this that unanimity must be abolished everywhere. According to proposal 3.2, unanimity is defensible if member states use abstention instead of blocking, and thus do not obstruct the use of existing instruments.

📖 Source: Kristian L. Nielsen: EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap (Journal of Contemporary European Research, 2013)

6.4.3 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

In his overview of diplomatic history, Kissinger presents two opposing roles of consensus. In the settlement after 1815, Austrian Foreign Minister Metternich turned the Holy Alliance into an obligation that bound the conservative monarchs to joint action. According to Kissinger, this in practice gave Austria a veto in principle over the adventures of its overwhelmingly powerful Russian ally, and the Concert of Europe meant that the competing powers settled matters affecting general stability by consensus. On the collective security of the interwar period, however, he passes a harsh judgement:

“And when sanctions were applied, they inevitably reflected the lowest common denominator, often proving so ineffectual that they did more harm than good.”

In other words: when the League of Nations applied sanctions, they inevitably reflected the lowest common denominator, and were often so ineffective that they did more harm than good. Kissinger sees the reason for this in the fact that collective security was built on the mistaken assumption that every state is equally interested in stopping a given act of aggression, and willing to take the same risk for it. Together, the two propositions are the two sides of the present Hungarian dilemma. Consensus protects the smaller actor where its own vital interest is at stake — in the Hungarian case, the rights of the community beyond the border. In sanctions policy, however, the logic of the lowest common denominator prevails, as was also seen in the bargain of 22 September. The area-by-area breakdown of proposal 3.1 translates this difference into a negotiating mandate. The volume is a copyrighted source, so the summary of the proposition on the Concert of Europe is a paraphrase.

📖 Source: Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

6.5 International comparison

Constructive abstention is not a theoretical instrument; member states have already used it. In 2008 Cyprus stood aside in this way from the establishment of the EU rule-of-law mission in Kosovo (EULEX): it did not recognise Kosovo’s independence, but did not obstruct the mission. In 2022 Austria, Ireland and Malta stayed out, in a similar form, of financing lethal weapons for Ukraine from the European Peace Facility, citing their military neutrality. In both cases the member state preserved its position of principle, and the Union was able to act. This is the model for proposal 3.2. In 2023 supporters of the switch to qualified majority set up a group of friends of nine, then ten member states, initiated by Germany, which advocates a gradual switch in the common foreign and security policy. The Hungarian position is therefore not taking shape in a vacuum: the package of conditions (under KP17) may find partners in both camps. Kissinger’s proposition on the Concert of Europe holds here too: a consensus-based order is durable if it also protects the vital interests of the smaller participants — a majority-based order is durable if it replaces this protection with another instrument.

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy
  • KP17 — Issue-based coalition-building in the EU
  • KP19 — International institutional reform position
  • KP23 — Alliance credibility audit (annual)

Defence

  • HV4 — EU defence industrial base and joint procurement

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A14 — Participation in international institutions and accountability

Proposed new programme point: A constructive abstention protocol and an area-differentiated Hungarian position on the EU decision-making reform — for the Foreign policy area (as an EU supplement to KP19: a mandate broken down by sanctions, enlargement and defence, abstention instead of the veto as the default instrument, and raising the minority-protection standard to EU level as a condition for consent).

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK foreign press monitor, 29 September 2026 — topic 1):

Supplementary press source (MIAK foreign press monitor, 23 September 2026):

Knowledge-base references (books):

  • 📖 European Union: Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
  • 📖 Kristian L. Nielsen: EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap
  • 📖 Henry Kissinger: Diplomacy

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point IDs: KP3, KP17, KP19, KP23)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV4)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A14)
  • MIAK policy area: Economy (background material)
  • MIAK foreign press monitor, 29 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 86/100
  • MIAK press monitor, 29 September 2026 (for the overview of the domestic band)

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