Part I — Situation overview

Between 23 and 25 September 2026, five mutually unrelated public-finance cases came to public attention. On 25 September Telex, citing an investigation by 24.hu, reported that during the Covid pandemic the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade awarded Limitless Medical Kft. a HUF 2.3 billion contract to supply 120 ventilators. The company was founded in April 2020, just three days before the contract, had no healthcare references, and liquidation proceedings were launched against it in February 2026. According to 24.hu, an internal investigation by the current leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs puts the possible damage from the 2020 Covid procurements in the order of a hundred billion forints. In the foreign ministry’s contracts the average price of a ventilator approached HUF 20 million, while the National Healthcare Services Centre (ÁEEK) bought them for an average of HUF 10.8 million. On 23 September the defence minister announced that the Ministry of Defence (HM) would file a criminal complaint. The reason includes, among other things, a contract of around HUF 12 billion concluded by the previous leadership with a London consultancy firm. According to HVG and 24.hu, the contract also covered training in the operation of German Lynx combat vehicles. On 24 September the Budapest Police Headquarters (BRFK) opened an investigation on suspicion of breach of trust concerning more than HUF 412 million in royalties paid to János Dénes Orbán. On the same day 24.hu and HVG reported that in 2024 the state secretariat for sport disputed a significant part of the accounts of the sports funding from corporate tax (tao) used by the Hungarian Football Federation (MLSZ). 24.hu wrote of HUF 55 billion, HVG of a total of HUF 58.17 billion. The state secretariat nevertheless did not request repayment. Also on 24 September, Prime Minister Péter Magyar announced in the Vatican that the Government would review the Hungary Helps aid programme and, in case of abuse, take legal action (file a criminal complaint).

These cases are the latest stages of a longer accountability series. In April MIAK wrote about an independent mechanism for investigating the Covid procurements (The investigation of the Covid procurements), and in July about an open grant system for culture funding (Accountability in culture funding). On 8 September it discussed the case-status register (Four accountability threads in a single day), and on 16 September the publicity of state companies’ procurement data (The Volánbusz case). On 18 September the topic was the investigation of politicians’ asset accumulation (Investigation of politicians’ asset accumulation). There is no final decision in any of the named cases; the investigations are being conducted against unknown perpetrators or without a suspect. Those concerned are entitled to the presumption of innocence.

MIAK’s reading: what the current cases have in common lies not in criminal law but in procedure. In each of them there was an exceptional situation — a pandemic, military development, a one-off cultural grant, sports funding, an aid programme — in which competition was skipped and control did not work afterwards either. There was no reference minimum in the selection of the supplier, and no itemised performance certification for the consultancy work. And in the disputed accounts there was no deadline that would have forced the authority to decide. These gaps will remain even if every ongoing proceeding ends with a judgment.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three sources provide the interpretative framework. Robert Klitgaard, an American economist and author of the classic handbook of anti-corruption policy, makes a specific observation on procurement in Controlling Corruption: the more unique the service purchased, the harder it is to establish the competitive price, and the greater the room for abuse. As a remedy, he recommends prior vendor screening and the separation of approval, receipt, payment and audit. Susan Rose-Ackerman, professor of law and economics at Yale University, emphasises in Corruption and Government that the most exposed procurements are those where it is difficult to establish afterwards whether performance took place at all. She therefore considers the key to be ex-post verification of goods and services actually delivered, rather than paper-based checks, together with comparison against market prices. The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) October 2025 Fiscal Monitor report offers two practical theses for today’s situation. A sustained increase in defence spending must be accompanied by a stronger procurement system, and digital procurement data are also suitable for flagging irregular payments. The detailed discussion of the literature — by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. Their common goal is that exceptional procedures should not be able to give rise to uncontrolled public spending — regardless of who happens to be in government.

3.1 Statutory emergency procurement protocol (bill to be submitted by 31 December 2026)

MIAK proposes that the Government submit to the National Assembly a bill on an “emergency procurement protocol”. It would apply to every procurement conducted outside the ordinary procedure of the Public Procurement Act on the grounds of a state of danger or extreme urgency. The protocol should consist of five elements. The first is a reference minimum: only a supplier with at least one closed financial year or verified performance of the same subject matter may be awarded a contract. In exceptional cases this may be departed from, but then an advance may be paid only against a bank guarantee and up to a maximum of 30 per cent of the purchase price. The second is prior screening: before the contract is concluded, it is mandatory to check that neither the supplier nor a manager linked to it is subject to a ban on company management, and that it has no public debts. The third is unit-price comparison: the contract must be compared with the unit prices paid by other state bodies in the same period, and any deviation of more than 20 per cent must be justified in writing. The fourth is full publication within 30 days of the conclusion of the contract, with the full contract text, the unit price and the ultimate beneficial owner, in the Electronic Public Procurement System (EKR). The fifth is a mandatory ex-post audit within 12 months: this should be carried out by the Government Control Office (KEHI), whose report should be made public and sent to the National Assembly and the State Audit Office (ÁSZ). The protocol does not affect the independence of the ÁSZ: the audit office decides within its own powers whether to include the procurement in its audit plan. The proposal is a direct application of the A2 public procurement transparency and the A1 public money dashboard programme points. The reference minimum and prior screening follow Klitgaard’s vendor-screening principle (see 6.4.1), and the unit-price comparison follows Rose-Ackerman’s price-comparison thesis (see 6.4.2).

3.2 Itemised performance certification for consultancy and training contracts (government decree by 31 March 2027, retrospective inventory at the Ministry of Defence by 31 December 2026)

MIAK proposes that three things be mandatory for every consultancy, training and regulatory-preparation contract above HUF 100 million. The first is a pre-defined, numbered list of deliverables: what document, training for how many people, how many hours, with what delivery deadline. The second is itemised performance certification tied to this list, recording item by item what the state accepted and where it was archived. The third is a short public justification of why the task is not performed by the body’s own staff or by a domestic institution. The person certifying performance should not be the same as the person approving the contract or authorising the payment. This is Klitgaard’s principle of separation of duties (see 6.4.1). For defence contracts, the summary of the contract and the certification should be public by default. Where this is not possible for national security reasons, the reason for classification must be recorded publicly, and the content should be reviewed by the competent committee of the National Assembly in a closed session. This is the “public by default, classified where justified” principle of programme point HV2. The Ministry of Defence should also draw up an inventory of its pre-2026 consultancy contracts: by amount, deliverable items and acceptance documentation. According to the IMF’s recommendation (see 6.4.3), growing defence spending must be accompanied by a stronger procurement system. In the years of military development, this inventory could serve as the benchmark for future contracts.

3.3 Time-limited closure of grant programmes and a public project list (tao closure by 30 June 2027, Hungary Helps list by 31 December 2026)

The MLSZ tao case shows that a disputed account can remain open for years if the law does not force the authority to decide. MIAK proposes that decisions on the accounts of state grants be made within a statutory deadline. A binding decision must be made within a maximum of 12 months of the submission of the account, after at most two requests for supplementary information: either accepting it or ordering repayment. Failure to meet the deadline must be publicly reported by the granting body. The state secretariat responsible for sport should publish a public table, by programme, of the currently open tao accounts, and decide on every period by 30 June 2027. For the Hungary Helps programme, MIAK calls for a public project list in parallel with the appointment of the new head, by 31 December 2026 at the latest. This should include the beneficiary, the country, the amount, the purpose of the grant and the certification of performance. After the review is completed, an independent impact assessment should be prepared on which projects achieved their goals. For cultural grants, the claim that appeared in the press — that two state sources were applied to for one production, and the other was not indicated in one of the applications — justifies a simple preventive rule. Every funded project should receive a uniform identifier, and granting bodies should cross-check grants against each other before deciding. The proposal extends the recovery mechanism of programme point A8 to domestic grants, and builds on programme points KP3 and KU5.

The common principle of the three proposals is that an exceptional situation should not mean an exception from accountability. Urgency can justify a faster procedure, but it does not justify the absence, even afterwards, of publicity, acceptance documentation and a decision. Klitgaard and Rose-Ackerman reach the same conclusion: where performance is hard to verify, the procedure must make up for what competition does not ensure.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Budget Unit-price comparison and the advance cap reduce the risk of overpricing and of work paid in advance but not performed In a genuine emergency, the reference minimum may slow down procurement if there are few experienced suppliers
Healthcare and crisis management In the next pandemic, procurement is documented, quantity needs are justified, and the ex-post audit is scheduled in advance Because of the stricter conditions, suppliers may build a higher risk premium into their prices
Defence Consultancy spending can be tracked item by item, and the reason for classification is public An expansive interpretation of classification claims could hollow out the rule
Grant policy Disputed accounts do not remain open for years, and recovery becomes predictable The pressure of the deadline may lead to hasty decisions ending in litigation
Public administration The work of KEHI and the granting bodies becomes plannable The administrative burden of ex-post audits and public lists may fall disproportionately on smaller bodies

The main trade-off is the relationship between urgency and control. In a genuine emergency the government has to decide within days, and overly strict preconditions may put lives at risk. MIAK’s proposal therefore does not prohibit fast procedures, but shifts control: fewer ex-ante and more ex-post checks. And the exception is made acceptable by financial safeguards (bank guarantee, advance cap). The second question is the handling of classified defence data. If every consultancy contract is classified, the publicity of performance certification remains on paper only. That is why the reason for classification must be recorded publicly and the content reviewed by a parliamentary committee. The third risk is the appearance of retroactive effect. The proposed deadlines apply to accounts submitted in the future and to the closure of proceedings already open. They do not create new obligations retroactively; they only make the enforcement of rules already in force mandatory.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs: Key Performance Indicators) for monitoring:

  • Publication rate: the percentage of contracts concluded outside the ordinary public procurement procedure that appear with the full text, the unit price and the ultimate beneficial owner within 30 days. Suggested target: 100%.
  • Ex-post audit coverage: the percentage of emergency procurements for which a public KEHI report is produced within 12 months. Suggested target: 100%.
  • Consultancy deliverables list: the percentage of consultancy and training contracts above HUF 100 million that have a pre-defined, numbered list of deliverables and itemised certification. Suggested target: 100% for contracts concluded from 2027.
  • Stock of open tao accounts: the number and amount of unclosed periods, and the amount ordered to be repaid and actually repaid. Worth tracking quarterly until the 30 June 2027 deadline.
  • Hungary Helps project list: the percentage of the programme’s grants to date that appear on the public list with the beneficiary, amount and performance certification. Suggested target: 100% by the end of 2026.

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s request is simple: the cases uncovered should result in a rule, not just proceedings. The Government should submit a bill on the emergency procurement protocol — with a reference minimum, unit-price comparison, full publication within 30 days and a mandatory ex-post audit. For consultancy contracts, only work accepted item by item should be payable. And decisions on grant accounts should be made by a deadline, with recovery where necessary. Criminal proceedings examine the cases of the past, and the court decides whether a crime was committed. The rule, however, decides whether the same thing can happen again in the next emergency.

Two of MIAK’s foundational values are at stake here. Accountability, because the common flaw of the cases uncovered was that after the exceptional procedure no one was obliged to decide, certify or reclaim. The proposals assign an obligation and a deadline to the authority at all three points. And transparency, because a unit-price deviation, a three-day company history or an unclosed account can only come to light in time if the data are public — not years later, through a journalistic investigation.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the public-affairs and left-liberal band, Telex, 24.hu and HVG chose an investigative framing centred on company histories. 24.hu’s ventilator series focuses on the track record of the winning companies and their hollowing-out after the pandemic. Telex picked out the most vivid element: the company founded three days before the contract, and the latex gloves auctioned at a starting price of HUF 70,000 during its liquidation. In the Covid test cases, HVG follows the fate of the proceedings. It shows that one investigation was terminated for lack of a criminal offence, while the other has been running for years without a suspect. The paper also highlights that the state paid half of the purchase price up front as an advance, so the suppliers could work without their own capital. This framing points towards the procedural question, although the paper itself does not formulate a rule proposal. In the MLSZ tao case, 24.hu and HVG make the authority’s failure — the letter without a deadline and the repayment that was never ordered — the backbone of the story, and also report the position of the MLSZ, according to which the letter has no legal effect and it rejects the findings.

In the cultural cases, Telex reported the opening of the investigation factually, with police confirmation. HVG and 24.hu, by contrast, built on a Facebook video by actor Áron Molnár, and quoted the claims about deficiencies in the application forms as the actor’s words. This difference matters: one is an official step, the other is a claim by a public figure that the granting body has not yet investigated. In the defence case, 444.hu relayed the minister’s social media announcement. The article presented the consultancy contract alongside personal-protection and luxury expenses, as a “the cupboard door has opened” type of revelation. The next-day articles of HVG and 24.hu focused on identifying the contracting company and on the oddity of the Lynx training — a British company teaching the operation of a German combat vehicle.

In the economic band, Portfolio covered the Hungary Helps review briefly, as part of the diplomatic news of the Vatican visit, emphasising the continuation of the programme and the selection of the new head through an open competition. The pro-government conservative band (Magyar Nemzet, Mandiner) did not put any of these topics in its top focus on that day. From the perspective of the presumption of innocence, it is worth noting that across the whole spectrum a significant part of the news is based on announcements by current government actors. The position of the named former decision-makers barely appears in the publicly available parts of the articles — a gap from the perspective of balanced reporting.

6.2 Facts and data

Data Value Source
Ventilator contract awarded to a newly founded company 120 units, HUF 2.3 billion; the company was set up three days before the contract Telex, 25 September 2026 (based on 24.hu’s investigation)
Average unit price of ventilators ÁEEK: HUF 10.8 million; foreign ministry contracts: close to HUF 20 million 24.hu, 25 September 2026 (based on the internal investigation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Possible damage from the 2020 Covid procurements in the order of a hundred billion forints (internal investigation estimate) 24.hu, 25 September 2026
Contracts of two Covid test suppliers HUF 1.7 and 3.15 billion, together close to 5 billion; half of the purchase price was paid as an advance HVG, 25 September 2026
Procedural status of the Covid test cases one investigation was terminated on 13 August 2025 for lack of a criminal offence; the other is running without a suspect HVG, 25 September 2026
Ministry of Defence consultancy contract with a London company around HUF 12 billion; criminal complaint against unknown perpetrators on suspicion of breach of trust 444.hu, 23 September 2026; HVG, 25 September 2026
Lynx procurement programme 218 Lynx KF41 combat vehicles, a modernisation programme worth more than two billion euros (announced in 2020) HVG, 25 September 2026
Royalties under investigation more than HUF 412 million; on suspicion of the felony of breach of trust, ongoing Telex, 24 September 2026 (BRFK statement)
Cost and revenue of a cultural production (press report) cost of more than HUF 644 million, HUF 44.6 million in ticket revenue HVG, 24 September 2026
Disputed tao accounts of the MLSZ (2024 report) HUF 58.17 billion; of which 17.57 billion not substantiated, 40.6 billion used without entitlement (finding of the state secretariat for sport) HVG, 24 September 2026 (based on 24.hu)
Amount proposed for rejection in currently open tao periods HUF 55.18 billion; for a further HUF 1.36 billion no account was even submitted HVG, 24 September 2026 (based on 24.hu)
Unclosed tao programmes of the MLSZ 11 programmes since 2014, more than HUF 100 billion 24.hu, 24 September 2026
Hungary’s control of corruption score according to the World Bank’s governance indicators (WGI — Worldwide Governance Indicators) −0.17 World Bank WGI 2024

Two remarks belong to the figures. First, most of the findings come from internal investigations of the current ministries or from press investigations. These are not facts established by a court, and some of those concerned — for example the MLSZ — dispute them. This is precisely why it is important that in the future the data on emergency procurements and grant accounts come from independent, public ex-post audits, not from after-the-fact political announcements. Second, the nearly twofold difference between the unit prices of ventilators does not in itself prove abuse, as the model, the delivery deadline and the market situation may also have differed. That is exactly why such a deviation must be justified in writing when the contract is concluded.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — publicity of exceptional procurements, unit-price comparison, the recovery mechanism (programme point ID: A2, A1, A8, A6);
  • Defence (programme points) — register of consultancy and procurement contracts, the obligation to justify classification (programme point ID: HV2, HV4);
  • Healthcare (background material) — lessons of pandemic procurements, stockpiling and the substantiation of quantity needs;
  • Culture (programme points) — open, transparent culture funding, cross-checking of grants (programme point ID: KU5);
  • Foreign policy (programme points) — transparency of Hungary Helps and foreign ministry procurements (programme point ID: KP3).

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

Klitgaard sees the structural conditions of corruption in the combination of monopoly, discretion and a lack of accountability. For the current cases, however, the book’s procurement chapters offer more direct guidance. Using an example, the author shows that if a state body buys a unique, customised good or service, it is difficult for the procurer to establish the competitive price. And this difficulty makes kickbacks and overpricing more likely. If instead it buys a standard product with a known price and known suppliers, it may fit its purposes less well, but the room for abuse narrows. A consultancy contract is a typical case of a customised service. Where the product cannot be standardised, an itemised description and certification of performance can substitute for price comparison.

The book also discusses two further tools in detail. One is prior screening, taken from US federal audit practice. Before a grant or contract is awarded, the applicant’s financial situation, public debts, criminal record and previous audit problems must be checked, and dishonest suppliers must be excluded from further contracts. The other is the basic rule of internal control: approval, record-keeping, receipt of assets, payment and audit must be assigned to different persons. Decision and certification in the same hands increase the risk of loss. In the ventilator case, according to the press, the contract went to a company founded three days earlier because the owner of the company originally selected, belonging to the same circle of interests, had previously been banned from company management by the court of registration, and the company’s bank account had been frozen. A functioning prior screening would have stopped the process in such a case, rather than steering it to a freshly founded company. The reference minimum in point 3.1 and the separation of duties in point 3.2 make these two Klitgaardian tools mandatory.

📖 Source: Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption

6.4.2 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

In discussing procurement abuses, Rose-Ackerman emphasises that it is not only large construction and investment projects that are vulnerable. Procurements where it is difficult to establish afterwards whether delivery or performance took place at all are particularly exposed. As examples she cites African cases where auditors uncovered the “procurement” of non-existent office supplies and irregular purchases of medicines. Services — consultancy, training, drafting of regulations — are even more vulnerable in this respect, because the “product” is often just a document or an event that has taken place.

The author discusses two remedies. The first is market price information: in a Korean procurement case, the US military uncovered overpricing of 10–30 per cent through comparative price analysis. Where competition could not be created, knowledge of the prices paid in other markets provided a basis for negotiation. The second is ex-post verification of actual performance: writing about the World Bank’s audit practice, she emphasises the need to move from paper records towards on-site inspection of the goods and services actually delivered. The World Bank excludes suppliers engaged in corrupt practices from further contracts for a fixed period or permanently. Rose-Ackerman also warns that uncontrolled, secret funds are breeding grounds for corruption everywhere. Where the national security budget is not public, at least a parliamentary committee must have oversight of it. Applied to the Hungarian case: the difference between the foreign ministry’s and ÁEEK’s unit prices is precisely the signal that the mandatory unit-price comparison in point 3.1 would reveal at the time the contract is concluded, not six years later. And the closed committee review in point 3.2 applies the author’s principle of parliamentary oversight to classified defence contracts.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.3 International Monetary Fund: Fiscal Monitor — Spending Smarter

The IMF’s October 2025 report is about the efficiency of public spending, and treats public procurement as a key risk area. According to the report, public procurement accounts for around 15 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the member states of the OECD, the international cooperation organisation of advanced economies. According to a cited estimate, around 16.7 per cent of procurement spending is lost in the average Latin American country. Procurement must therefore be competitive, transparent and aligned with budgetary priorities. On defence, the report states:

“Any sustained increases in fiscal spending for defense should be accompanied by strengthened procurement systems, better multiyear budget planning, and credible financing strategies.”

The report also names a practical tool: digital procurement processes generate data that can reduce the cost of audits and flag irregular payments. In Hungary, the years of military development coincide with the review of earlier defence contracts. According to the IMF’s thesis, a larger defence budget is only efficient if the procurement and performance certification system is strengthened along with it. The EKR-based 30-day publication in point 3.1 and the itemised list of deliverables in point 3.2 would generate exactly these data.

📖 Source: International Monetary Fund: Fiscal Monitor — Spending Smarter: How Efficient and Well-Allocated Public Spending Can Boost Economic Growth (October 2025)

6.5 International comparison

EU law already provides a yardstick for the ex-post publicity of emergency procurement. In cases of extreme urgency, Public Procurement Directive 2014/24/EU allows a negotiated procedure without prior publication. However, even in such cases the contract award notice must be published no later than 30 days after the conclusion of the contract. MIAK’s 30-day rule is therefore not a new burden, but an extension of an existing EU requirement to every exceptional procurement, together with the full contract text. The British experience during the pandemic shows what happens if this is not implemented. According to a 2020 investigation by the UK National Audit Office, a large proportion of pandemic-era contracts were awarded without competition, and contracts were often published late. In 2021 the High Court in London ruled, on a claim brought by a civil society organisation, that the government had breached its 30-day publication obligation.

The strongest model of contract transparency in the region is Slovakia. There, since 2011, state contracts have appeared in a central public register, and publication is a condition for the contract’s entry into force. According to the background material of MIAK’s programme point A1, after its introduction procurement prices fell by 5–8 per cent in the transparent categories. For defence procurement, the practice of the Swedish Defence Materiel Administration (FMV) is the closest model: contracts above SEK 10 million are public, and the agency publishes an annual report on procurement efficiency. For recovery, the best-known example is the United States’ False Claims Act. It links the recovery of federal payments obtained through fraud with a financial stake for whistleblowers. The common principle of all three models: publicity and recovery are not ad hoc political decisions, but an automatic corollary of the contract or grant.

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A2 — Public procurement transparency
  • A1 — Public money dashboard
  • A8 — Cohesion policy accountability
  • A6 — Strengthening checks and balances
  • A5 — Whistleblower system

Defence

  • HV2 — Transparency of defence spending
  • HV4 — EU defence industrial base and joint procurement

Culture

  • KU5 — Cultural participation index and open culture funding

Foreign policy

  • KP3 — Transparent foreign policy

Proposed new programme point: Emergency procurement protocol — reference minimum, advance cap, unit-price comparison, full publication within 30 days and a mandatory ex-post audit within 12 months for every contract concluded outside the ordinary public procurement procedure — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

Proposed new programme point: Time-limited closure of grant accounts — a decision deadline of at most 12 months, a mandatory recovery decision and a public accounts table by programme — for the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 25 September 2026 — topic 4):

Knowledge base references (books):

  • 📖 Robert Klitgaard: Controlling Corruption
  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 International Monetary Fund: Fiscal Monitor — Spending Smarter (October 2025)

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A1, A2, A5, A6, A8)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Defence (programme points; programme point ID: HV2, HV4)
  • MIAK policy area: Healthcare (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Culture (programme points; programme point ID: KU5)
  • MIAK policy area: Foreign policy (programme points; programme point ID: KP3)
  • MIAK press monitor, 25 September 2026 — topic 4, score: 84/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Electronic Public Procurement System (EKR) — contract data and award notices
  • Government Control Office (KEHI) and State Audit Office (ÁSZ) — audit reports
  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 2024
  • Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement (publication of contract award notices)
  • United Kingdom, National Audit Office — 2020 investigation report on government procurement during the pandemic

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