Part I — Situation overview

On Friday, 18 September 2026, the government resolution signed by Prime Minister Péter Magyar on the 35-year motorway concession contract concluded on 17 May 2022 was published in the Hungarian Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny). According to the accounts of Telex and Portfolio, the Government considers that the contract and its amendments raise serious concerns under Hungarian and EU law, and that a gross disproportion between performance and consideration may arise. The resolution does not terminate the contract. It instructs Dávid Vitézy, Minister for Transport and Investment, to inform the concessionaires (the seven private equity funds that are parties to the contract) and the concession company, Magyar Koncessziós Infrastruktúra Fejlesztő Zrt. (MKIF), and then to initiate negotiations on closing the legal relationship. If this does not lead to a result, the minister must make a proposal for closing the legal relationship. The resolution also prescribes the continuity of operation and of the developments already started. At the government press briefing the minister justified the negotiated route by saying that in the event of unilateral termination, the international arbitral tribunal stipulated in the contract (a non-state judicial forum designated by the parties) would decide, in proceedings that could last for years. It was also announced that a criminal complaint would be filed against persons unknown. MKIF stated that it would form its position after the official written notification.

This is MIAK’s fifth analysis of this concession. In July MIAK asked for the publication of the payments and of the value-for-money balance, and a week later for an audit of risk sharing. On 30 August it proposed a public register of long-term commitments, and on 6 September a review protocol and an exit cost estimate. The present decision opens three new questions. The first: how much is a settlement worth to the state, and what should it contain. The second: how could 175.6 billion forints of availability fee (the fixed fee that the state pays, independently of traffic, for keeping the roads in working order) be left out of the 2026 budget. The Ministry of Finance is currently examining whether this is a criminal offence. The third: how Magyar Közút takes back the operation and the roughly 900 employees.

MIAK’s reading: the negotiated closure is legally the smaller risk, but the settlement itself is also a commitment. If its price, its content and the treatment of the creditors are decided behind the same closed doors as the 2022 contract, then the Government will exchange a bad contract for an agreement that cannot be scrutinised. The lawfulness of the concession may ultimately be decided by a court or an arbitral tribunal; following the complaint, the opening of an investigation is decided by the investigating authority, and criminal liability ultimately by the court. The rules of the settlement, however, must be laid down now, before signature.

Part II — Foundations in the literature

Three classic works provide a framework for the three questions of the closure. Susan Rose-Ackerman (professor at Yale Law School, a leading researcher of the political economy of corruption) warns in her book Corruption and Government (1999) that the durability of a reform often requires compensating its losers. The danger, however, is that the compensation grows so large that it hollows out the reform itself. This is the most precise benchmark for the price of the settlement. Kornai János (Hungarian-born economist, the author of the theory of the soft budget constraint; Harvard professor between 1986 and 2002) describes this phenomenon, in English the soft budget constraint, in his main work A hiány (Economics of Shortage, 1980). Its essence is that the economic actor shares its risk with the state and ultimately shifts the consequences of bad luck onto it. This explains the concessionaire’s after-the-fact compensation for additional costs, and also a budget in which a certain obligation exists only as an accounting item. According to the book Globalization and Its Discontents (2002) by Joseph E. Stiglitz (American economist and Nobel Memorial Prize laureate, former chief economist of the World Bank), whoever makes a bad loan must also bear the consequences. Otherwise moral hazard (an actor counting on a bailout is less careful) destroys discipline. This applies directly to the creditor banks. The detailed treatment of the literature — by author, with quotations — is in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures. The first settles the content of the settlement, the second the completeness of the budget, and the third the takeover of operation. All three can be launched in the course of implementing the government resolution, without new statutory authorisation. Laying down the budget rule permanently is within the competence of the National Assembly, on the basis of a Government proposal.

3.1 A settlement cap, without a waiver, with publicity before signature (before the signature of the settlement)

The negotiations serve the public interest if the price of the agreement does not exceed the expected cost of the litigation route. MIAK proposes that at the start of the negotiations the Ministry of Transport and Investment commission an independent assessment of the arbitration scenario: how much compensation an arbitral tribunal could award, how long the proceedings would take, and what they would cost. This should be the upper limit of the settlement. The basis of compensation should be the concessionaire’s verified, not yet recovered actual expenditure, not the profit planned for 35 years. The dividends already taken out must be deducted from this: according to the minister, MKIF paid 47.5 billion forints in dividends over the past three years. The settlement should not contain a general waiver of the state’s claims for damages. Nor should it contain any clause that obstructs the criminal proceedings launched following the complaint or the recovery of assets. No confidentiality clause should be included either: the minister presented the 2024 state declaration that could not be made public, and it is precisely this pattern that must not be repeated. The claims of the creditor banks (according to 24.hu, OTP, MBH and the partly state-owned Hungarian Development Bank) should appear on a separate line. The partly state-owned bank should not receive more favourable treatment than the private banks in any form. The draft settlement should be public 15 days before signature. The competent committee of the National Assembly should request the opinion of the State Audit Office (ÁSZ) on it and hold a public hearing. Rose-Ackerman’s warning (see 6.4.1) and Stiglitz’s creditor argument (see 6.4.3) coincide here. The proposal applies the principles of the A1 public-money dashboard, the G6 anti-rent-seeking programme and the G10 politically independent development bank. The benchmark for compensation follows the property protection principle of I5: full, but not excessive.

3.2 A budget completeness rule for multi-year contractual obligations (by the submission of the 2027 budget bill)

Telex asked at the government press briefing: according to the minister, no government decision was found that would lawfully justify leaving out the fees. According to a document the paper obtained earlier, the line ministry’s original cost request was reduced by the economic ministry. MIAK’s August proposal concerned the register of obligations; this case shows that a register alone is not enough if the budget act can depart from it. MIAK therefore proposes a reconciliation rule. In the annex to the 2027 budget bill, every multi-year contractual obligation (concession, contract based on public–private cooperation, the so-called PPP contract, investment based on an international treaty) should appear with two figures. One is the amount due in the given year under the contract, the other is the planned appropriation. If the two differ, the Ministry of Finance should describe the reason and the legal basis of the difference item by item. Such a reason may be an ongoing renegotiation on which a government decision has been taken. The difference between the line ministries’ original cost requests and the final appropriation should also be public. The Fiscal Council, which under the Fundamental Law examines the soundness of the central budget, should make a separate statement on completeness in its opinion. Under Article 36(2) of the Fundamental Law, the budget bill must contain state expenditure in a transparent manner and with reasonable detail. The Government should submit the permanent rule to the National Assembly in a bill, as an amendment of the Act on Public Finances. According to Kornai’s thesis (see 6.4.2), a constraint that exists only as an accounting relationship does not discipline. The proposal is a practical precondition of the G1 data-driven budget and the G21 spending review programme points.

3.3 A public takeover plan and service indicators for Magyar Közút (within 30 days, monthly after the takeover)

According to the minister, after the end of the concession Magyar Közút will take back the operation and maintenance of the motorways, the engineering depots, the equipment and the 900 previously outsourced employees. The 2022 arrangement transferred 18 engineering units and the entire machinery fleet, which is why an immediate takeback is difficult. The goal is a handover at the end of the year, so the takeover may fall in the middle of winter operations. MIAK proposes that the ministry publish a takeover plan within 30 days, with three elements. (1) An inventory of assets and contracts: engineering units, machines, ongoing subcontracts, including the one for the widening of the M1, whose continuity the resolution also prescribes. (2) A labour law guarantee: employees should transfer without interruption, under the Labour Code’s rules on the succession of employers. Under the proposal, their pay and benefits at the time of the takeover should not be reduced for at least one year. (3) Service indicators: the response time of winter de-icing, the average time for repairing pavement defects and the time to reach accident sites should be public every month, measured against the 2025 level. According to Magyar Közút’s own analysis, it would operate 53 per cent more cheaply and carry out major maintenance 61 per cent more cheaply. This claim should be checked after 12 months by an independent, public ex-post impact assessment, in line with the G20 programme point. The publicity of subcontracts follows the public procurement transparency principle of A2: after the takeover, Magyar Közút should put subcontracted works out to tender in public procurement procedures.

The three proposals are linked by a single principle: the closure is better than the contract if every element of it is measurable and known in advance. Such elements are the price of the settlement, the completeness of the budget and the condition of the roads taken over. Kornai, Rose-Ackerman and Stiglitz say the same thing from three sides: if the loss is always ultimately borne by the state, the constraint remains soft, and the next contract will also be built on this.

Part IV — Expected effects and risks

Dimension Expected effect Risk
Budget The monthly fee payments of 20–25 billion forints may end; the completeness rule excludes hidden obligations The one-off payment of the settlement may increase the deficit in the year of closure; full appropriation also raises the deficit shown on paper
Legal risk The estimate of the litigation alternative disciplines the negotiations and makes the Government’s decision defensible before a court as well If the concessionaire does not settle, arbitration proceedings may drag on for years; publicity also reveals the negotiating position
Financial system Equal treatment of creditors prevents the state from taking over the losses of private creditors through the partly state-owned bank Banks may price future state infrastructure projects with a higher risk premium
Transport and services Monthly service indicators make it visible if the takeover worsens the condition of the roads In the case of a winter takeover, any disruption during the handover of machinery and staff creates a risk of accidents
Rule of law and credibility The prohibition of waivers leaves the criminal and damages routes open The parallel running of the complaint and the negotiations may look like pressure in the concessionaire’s eyes, which hardens its negotiating position

The main dilemma lies between speed and verifiability. The Government would like to close the matter by the end of the year, while MIAK’s proposal would insert a 15-day public preliminary phase and an ÁSZ opinion before signature. This may delay the agreement by weeks, and every month of delay costs 20–25 billion forints. On the other side, however, a settlement worth several hundred billion that is later called into question by a court, an ÁSZ report or a subsequent government wipes out the whole point of the closure. The proposal becomes risky if the price of the settlement is determined by a political deadline rather than by the estimate of the litigation alternative. In the case of the budget completeness rule the risk is smaller: justifying a difference is only an administrative burden, and a temporarily higher reported deficit is not new expenditure, only the accounting of reality.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth following? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes four key performance indicators (KPIs, Key Performance Indicators), from which it will be visible after 6, 12 and 24 months whether the closure meets the benchmark of verifiability:

  • Publicity of the settlement: whether the draft settlement, the estimate of the litigation alternative and the ÁSZ opinion were public before signature (yes/no). Suggested target: all three yes.
  • Price of the settlement compared with the litigation alternative: the ratio of the compensation paid to the expected cost of arbitration according to the independent estimate. Suggested target: at most 1, after deducting the dividends taken out.
  • Budget completeness: how many multi-year contractual obligations in the 2027 budget bill have an appropriation that differs from the contractual amount without justification. Suggested target: zero.
  • Service continuity: in the first winter after the takeover, the de-icing response time and the pavement repair time should not deteriorate compared with the 2025 level. In addition, it is worth following what percentage of the 900 employees taken over are still with the state road management company six months later.

5.2 Summary

MIAK asks the Government to make the rules of the negotiated closure public before the first negotiating round. The upper limit of the settlement should be the litigation cost according to the independent estimate, less the dividends taken out. It should contain no waiver or confidentiality, and the partly state-owned bank should not receive more favourable treatment than the private creditors. MIAK asks the National Assembly to see, side by side in the annex to the 2027 budget, the amounts due under the contracts and the planned amounts. And it asks Magyar Közút for a public takeover plan and monthly service data. The government resolution chose negotiation instead of termination, which is the legally lower-risk route. The outcome of the negotiations, however, will only be credible if the public knows the benchmark before it knows the agreement.

Two MIAK foundational values are affected. Transparency, because both of the main faults of the case, the secret declaration and the omitted budget item, arose from decisions shielded from the public, and the closure must not repeat this pattern. Accountability, because the criminal complaint and the claim for damages can remain meaningful instruments only if the settlement does not quietly close them off.

Part VI — Reasoning and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

In the left-liberal band Telex was the most precise: its article on the resolution highlighted that the concession does not end immediately, and explained the negotiations with the arbitration risk. The paper followed the budget thread in a separate article, and asked about the government decision justifying the omission of the fees. 444.hu presented the functioning of the concession, the logic of the availability fee and the series of amendments in an explainer. In its headline it highlighted the flow of public money of 96 million per hour, and in its introduction that many consider the case one of the most serious abuses of the period. HVG’s summary of the government press briefing put the Prime Minister’s sentence “it’s over” in its headline. An opinion piece in hvg360 drew a historical parallel between the case and the 2004 M6 concession dispute, and argued with strong characterisations, naming the former decision-makers.

In the public-affairs band, 24.hu’s live coverage provided the most figures: the full value of the contract, the dividends, Magyar Közút’s cost analysis and the banks’ loan agreement as well. According to the headline and lead of the coverage, the Government is “breaking” the contract, which is stronger than the text of the resolution. ATV highlighted from the minister’s interview on Egyenes Beszéd the vivid order of magnitude (“46 truckloads of twenty-thousand-forint notes”) and the supplier chain, and put it that the Government is “officially terminating” the contract. Index, via MTI, published the concessionaire’s reaction: it was the only article that put the voice of the other party in the foreground. In the economic band, Portfolio analysed the text of the resolution most thoroughly. It recorded that the resolution is phrased in the conditional (“may arise”), does not detail the objectionable provisions, and also prescribes the continuity of operation.

In the conservative band, Magyar Nemzet chose counter-framing: in two articles it emphasised that Dávid Vitézy was state secretary for transport in 2022, and Péter Magyar was a member of the board of directors of Magyar Közút. The second article also presented the minister’s response: his mandate as state secretary lasted from May to November 2022, and at the time of the later amendments he was no longer working for the state. Common to the whole spectrum is that several outlets described the decision with the verbs of termination, although the resolution orders negotiations. None of the outlets wrote in substance about the price of the settlement, the treatment of the creditors or the institutional rule of budget completeness.

6.2 Facts and data

Item Value Source
Publication of the government resolution 18 September 2026, Hungarian Official Gazette (Magyar Közlöny); instruction to negotiate, responsible for implementation: Minister for Transport and Investment, deadline: immediately Telex, Portfolio, 18 September 2026
The contract 17 May 2022, between the Hungarian State and seven private equity funds (Themis, Konzum PE, Opus New Way, Opus Bridge, Cronus, Vesta, Via) Portfolio, Telex
Scope and term 1,237 km road network, 35 years, until 2057 444.hu
Contract amendments twice in 2023, once in 2025; the December 2023 amendment introduced compensation for additional investment costs 444.hu, 24.hu
Value of the concession 2021 impact study: 13,900 billion HUF; base contract: 17,299 billion HUF; with amendments and options: approx. 25,900 billion HUF; total payments as things stand today: 23,196 billion HUF 24.hu (the minister’s data)
Monthly fee payments 20–25 billion HUF 24.hu
The omitted item 175.6 billion HUF of the expressway network availability fee was missing from the 2026 budget; the ministry flagged a total of 285.6 billion HUF of unfunded expenditure Telex, 18 September 2026
MKIF’s results 95.7 billion HUF of after-tax profit and 47.5 billion HUF of dividends over the past three years 24.hu (the minister’s data)
Creditors OTP, MBH and the partly state-owned MFB; the loan agreement was concluded after the state waived its statutory right of termination in 2024 24.hu
Cost comparison according to Magyar Közút’s analysis, 53% cheaper operation, 61% cheaper major maintenance 24.hu
Capacity to be taken back approx. 900 employees, 18 engineering units, the entire machinery fleet 24.hu
M6 option according to the ministry, rejecting the call-off of the option saves 105 billion over 11 years, and approx. 300 billion HUF over the full period 24.hu
Legal scenarios the ministry has five legal scenarios ATV, 18 September 2026

Some data require a separate note. Three different figures are circulating for the hourly payment. 444.hu writes 96 million forints, 77 million forints was mentioned in the interview given to ATV, and according to 24.hu the net payment in 2027 is 41.4 million forints per hour. The figures probably refer to different bases: an average calculated over the full term, a gross or a net amount, or a single year. MIAK therefore does not highlight any of them. Two figures also appear for the owners’ expected profit: according to 24.hu a financial model validated by Deloitte gives 3,633 billion, while 3,300 billion forints was mentioned in the ATV interview. The press reports differing data on the ownership shares, so MIAK does not cite them. According to Telex’s document, the economic ministry changed the line ministry’s cost request of 310 billion to 210 billion. This amount cannot be reconciled with the 175.6 billion shortfall from the public data; it presumably refers to a different set of items or a different base. Finally: the complaint is against persons unknown. No one may be considered guilty until a court has established this in a final judgment. The Ministry of Finance is examining whether the budget planning constitutes a criminal offence; this is neither a prosecutorial nor a judicial finding.

6.3 Policy dimensions

  • Economy (programme points) — the budget completeness rule is a precondition of G1 (data-driven budget) and G21 (systematic review of state expenditure); the settlement cap follows the logic of G6 (anti-rent-seeking programme); the treatment of the partly state-owned bank is a question for G10 (politically independent development bank); the after-the-fact measurement of the takeover falls within the scope of G20 (economic policy impact assessment system);
  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the publicity of the settlement before signature is an application of A1 (public-money dashboard), and the competitive tendering of subcontracted works of A2 (public procurement transparency);
  • Transport and infrastructure (background material) — the competition for resources between taking back the operation of the expressway network and the condition of the secondary roads;
  • Justice (programme points) — the extent of compensation follows the full but not excessive compensation principle of I5 (protection of property rights); the lawfulness of the concession may be decided by a court or an arbitral tribunal.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government

Writing about the sustainability of reforms, Rose-Ackerman starts from the premise that lasting change often requires compensating those who lose because of the reform. Compensation is not always necessary, but it often increases the chances of success. In the same place she also sets the limit:

“The danger, of course, is that the concessions made to existing officials are so large that the very effectiveness of the reform is undermined.”

Another chapter of the book deals with large contracts and concessions, and describes an uncomfortable paradox. Under certain conditions, a fair, impartial judicial system can also sustain bad deals: private parties take on risky bargains because they trust that the court will protect the concession they have obtained. Rose-Ackerman also describes how the beneficiary of such a deal reckons with the possibility that a new government will not necessarily respect the old commitments. Translated to the Hungarian closure: the concessionaire’s legal position may be strong, which is why the Government rightly avoids the long arbitration route. But the settlement is itself compensation, and if it is too large, it hollows out precisely the reform that the closure should serve. That is why MIAK proposes the settlement cap under 3.1, based on the estimate of the litigation alternative, less the dividends. In Rose-Ackerman’s framework the estimate is not a gesture of distrust, but the benchmark of whether the compensation still serves the reform.

📖 Source: Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform

6.4.2 Kornai János: A hiány (Economics of Shortage)

Among the conditions of the soft budget constraint, Kornai lists free state grants, one-off subsidies covering losses and a soft credit system. He records that similar phenomena may also occur among private enterprises. Among the consequences, he writes this about uncertainty:

“A vállalat nem viseli egymaga a kockázatot, hanem megosztja azt az állammal. […] Ha azonban balszerencse érte, vagy önmaga rosszul alkalmazkodott a körülményekhez, a következményeket valószínűleg át tudja hárítani másra: a vevőre áremelés révén, a hitelezőire, s mindenekelőtt az államra.”

According to Kornai, such a constraint no longer actually influences the behaviour of actors; it exists only as a mere accounting relationship. The hardness of the constraint depends on expectations: if bailouts are frequent enough, the general belief develops that the constraint is soft. In the motorway case this appears at two levels. The 2023 contract amendment, citing wartime inflation, introduced compensation for additional investment costs, meaning that the concessionaire could shift the consequences of bad luck onto the state. This is the classic Kornai pattern, only applied to a private company. The second level is the budget itself: if a contractual payment that is certainly due can be left out of the appropriation, then the budget act is also only an accounting relationship, and does not discipline. The completeness rule under 3.2 hardens this second level. And the settlement cap under 3.1 hardens the first: if the closure reimburses the full planned profit, the next concessionaire will also count on a bailout.

📖 Source: Kornai János: A hiány (Economics of Shortage, 1980)

6.4.3 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

Criticising international rescue packages, Stiglitz formulates the principle of creditor responsibility:

“In standard market economics, if a lender makes a bad loan, he bears the consequence. […] The creditors, anticipating an IMF bailout, have weakened incentives to ensure that the borrowers will be able to repay.”

Another part of the book presents a successful example of concession renegotiation. After independence, Botswana concluded a diamond concession whose payback period, according to Stiglitz’s description, was a few months. On the argument of a World Bank lawyer, the government initiated renegotiation, in the face of fierce resistance from the mining company. In the end the discovery of a new deposit provided the occasion to renegotiate the entire relationship, and the new agreement also preserved good relations between the parties. Taken together, the two theses answer the creditor question of the Hungarian closure. According to 24.hu, the banks concluded the loan agreement with the concession company after the state waived its statutory right of termination in 2024, that is, it was the state declaration that made the risk acceptable to them. If the settlement now fully reimburses the creditors’ claims out of the state’s money, it reinforces the moral hazard described by Stiglitz. Favouring the partly state-owned bank would, moreover, move the loss from one of the state’s pockets to the other. Botswana’s example shows that negotiated restructuring can work if the state has a credible alternative. The litigation estimate under 3.1 makes precisely this credible alternative visible.

📖 Source: Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

6.5 International comparison

There are several European examples of the early closure of long-term PPP and concession contracts. In Portugal, in the framework of the EU and IMF programme launched in 2011, the government renegotiated its motorway concession and availability-fee contracts. The renegotiation aimed at reducing the fees, and took place with the involvement of the creditors. In Spain, the operation of bankrupt toll motorways was taken over by a state infrastructure company from 2018. There, the state’s obligation to pay compensation opened a legal dispute lasting years, which shows the cost and time requirements of the litigation route. In the United Kingdom, some hospital PFI contracts (the British version of PPP) were bought out by the contracting authorities. The decision was based on a cost comparison of the buyout and the continuation of the contract, and this is the logic of MIAK’s cap under 3.1.

There is also established practice on budget completeness. Eurostat’s ESA 2010 methodology (the EU system of national accounts) prescribes when a PPP asset and the related liability must be shown on the state’s balance sheet. The joint tool of the IMF and the World Bank (PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model) serves to assess the fiscal risks of PPP contracts. Chile’s budget office regularly publishes a report on contingent liabilities, including concession obligations. The common lesson of international experience: the price of a closure is defensible if the benchmark is public in advance, and a budget is credible if the difference between contractual obligations and appropriations is visible. In the Hungarian case both were missing.

Economy

  • G1 — Data-driven budget
  • G6 — Programme against rent-seeking and regulatory capture
  • G10 — State development bank
  • G20 — Economic policy impact assessment system
  • G21 — Systematic review of state expenditure

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A1 — Public-money dashboard
  • A2 — Public procurement transparency

Justice

  • I5 — Protection of property rights

Proposed new programme point: Budget completeness rule and minimum settlement standard for multi-year contractual obligations (showing the contractual and appropriated amounts side by side, justified differences; a settlement cap based on the litigation alternative, without waiver and confidentiality) — for the Economy area, maintained jointly with the Transparency and anti-corruption policy area.

6.7 List of sources

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 19 September 2026 — topic 1):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Susan Rose-Ackerman: Corruption and Government — Causes, Consequences, and Reform
  • 📖 Kornai János: A hiány (Economics of Shortage, 1980)
  • 📖 Joseph E. Stiglitz: Globalization and Its Discontents

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Economy (programme points; programme point IDs: G1, G6, G10, G20, G21)
  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point IDs: A1, A2)
  • MIAK policy area: Transport and infrastructure (background material)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I5)
  • MIAK press monitor, 19 September 2026 — topic 1, score: 92/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • Fundamental Law of Hungary — Article XXVIII(2) (presumption of innocence), Article 36(2) (content of the budget bill), Article 38(3)–(4) (proportionality of value, transparent contracting party), Article 39(2) (data relating to public funds are data of public interest)
  • Act V of 2013 on the Civil Code — Section 6:98 (gross disproportion in value)
  • Act I of 2012 on the Labour Code — rules on the succession of employers
  • Eurostat — ESA 2010 methodology on the statistical recording of PPP contracts
  • IMF and World Bank — PPP Fiscal Risk Assessment Model (PFRAM)

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