Part I — Situation overview

On 15 June 2026 the National Assembly adopted the sixteenth amendment to the Fundamental Law. The package contains three distinct elements built on a common logic. First: a temporal limit is placed on the prime-ministerial mandate — whoever has served eight full years as head of government may no longer be re-elected. Second: the public-interest asset-management foundations (kekvák) are abolished — those private-law foundation constructions into which significant state assets and the maintainer rights of state universities were organised out in recent years. Third: the Sovereignty Protection Office is abolished, and the amendment expressly makes it possible to reclaim the siphoned-off public assets. Telex, HVG, 444.hu, Portfolio, 24.hu and ATV all carried it as a lead story; the Fidesz parliamentary group in a statement branded the move “a brutal restriction of democracy”.

It must be put with public-law precision: the constitutional amendment was adopted not by “the government” but by the National Assembly — only parliament may enact statute and constitutional amendment (Article 6 of the Fundamental Law), the government can at most submit. The amendment is of constitutional rank and therefore required a two-thirds majority; this was secured by the two-thirds (parliamentary) mandate won at the April 2026 election — in the 199-seat National Assembly the 141 seats, exceeding the 134-seat threshold and sufficient for constitutional amendment, constituted the political force. The promulgation of the adopted constitutional amendment is an act of the President of the Republic, with substantive veto weighing only in a narrow range.

The temporal limit and the institutional abolitions amount to a deep reshaping of the system of checks and balances. By MIAK’s reading the character of the problem is not whether action against the concentration of power is “good” or “bad” — the aim in principle is right — but whether the constitutional instrument now applied is an impersonal, institution-strengthening reform, or a tailor-made, institution-dismantling move that the next majority can reverse just as easily. A constitutional guarantee is worth something only if it survives the political moment in which it was born.

Part II — Literature foundation

Before turning to MIAK’s concrete proposals, it is worth fixing the conceptual frame within which the concentration of power and its limitation can be interpreted. According to the thesis of Montesquieu (18th-century French legal philosopher, the classic founder of the separation of powers), where the legislative and the executive power unite in a single hand, no liberty can remain — the temporal and institutional limits are meant precisely to prevent this concentration. The distinction drawn by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (economists, leading authors of institutional economics, awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics in 2024) between inclusive and extractive institutions is a direct argument that the institution-strengthening and the institution-dismantling move are not the same: the condition of lasting prosperity is a predictable institutional system that distributes power. The description by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman (authors of Spin Dictators) of modern concentration of power — the co-optation of the media, the quiet subjugation of institutions — shows why precisely the term limit and independent oversight are the most effective preventive instruments. The detailed literature treatment — author by author, with quotations — can be found in section 6.4 Literature in detail.

Part III — MIAK’s concrete proposal

MIAK proposes three measurable measures that turn the principled aim of the now-adopted amendment — the prevention of the concentration of power — into a lasting, impersonal and irreversibly embedded guarantee.

3.1 A “stress test” of the constitutional changes and broad consultation (started immediately)

MIAK proposes that every far-reaching constitutional change — including the present term limit — receive a mandatory, independent constitutional stress test (I10): an annually repeated, public examination of whether the system of checks and balances would prevent a hypothetical future concentration of power. The test is relevant even where the direction of the change is right: it measures whether the rule works the same in anyone’s hands. The legitimacy of the amendment comes not from the two-thirds majority in itself, but from the quality of the procedure — MIAK therefore proposes the involvement of the Venice Commission (the constitutional-law expert body of the Council of Europe) and the broadest possible parliamentary consultation, so that the limit is embedded not against a single political actor but as a lasting guarantee applying to everyone equally.

3.2 Institutional reinforcement of checks and balances in place of the abolished bodies (within the legislative cycle)

The abolition of the Sovereignty Protection Office does not in itself strengthen checks and balances — it merely abolishes an institution. MIAK’s programme point A6 asks for more than this: the actual independence of the Constitutional Court, the State Audit Office (ÁSZ), the prosecution service and the ombudsman must be measured in an annual, public Institutional Health Report (with at least ten objective indicators, in international comparison). The goal is accountability through the power of publicity, not direct intervention. The term limit complements this with the logic of the A9 spin-dictatorship-prevention index: a system of preventing the concentration of power that is underpinned by a metric and trackable year on year.

3.3 Recovery of the siphoned-off public assets in an impartial judicial procedure (within the institution-building cycle)

The recovery of the public assets organised into the kekvák is a legitimate goal, but the manner of implementation decides credibility. MIAK’s position is unambiguous: asset recovery should take place in an independent judicial procedure, respecting the property-right guarantees (I5 — protection of property rights), not in the weighing of a political body. If the legitimate goal is achieved by procedural short-circuiting, it becomes vulnerable itself — and sets a precedent for the next majority. Transparency is ensured by the principle of A8 cohesion accountability: the fate of the recovered assets should be traceable item by item on a public data sheet.

The common principle of these three proposals: action against the concentration of power is lasting if it strengthens the institutions, not if — even with good intentions — it dismantles or bypasses them. The impersonal, irreversibly embedded guarantee survives the political cycle; the tailor-made instrument does not.

Part IV — Expected impacts and risks

Dimension Expected impact Risk
Public law / institutions The prime-ministerial term limit is a lasting check against the concentration of power; the kekva construction can be replaced with more transparent public-asset management If the change is easily reversible, the next majority can rewrite it the same way — the guarantee hollows out
Economy / public assets The recovery of the siphoned-off assets can restore the transparency of public assets; settling university maintenance releases EU funding conditions Property-right uncertainty, legal disputes, a worsening of investor risk perception if the procedure is not predictable
Society / legitimacy With broad consultation the amendment can become a symbol of democratic renewal If perceived as “tailor-made”, it may deepen profound political division, and external perception does not improve either

The main point to weigh is where the reform tips over from institution-strengthening into institution-dismantling. The term limit works if it is general (it applies to anyone, not aimed against a single person), of constitutional rank (not changeable by simple majority), and accompanied by independent oversight. Asset recovery works if it is judicial and not political. Where these conditions are breached, the legitimate goal breeds procedural vulnerability — and sacrifices long-term credibility for the short-term result.

Part V — Measurability and summary

5.1 What is worth tracking? (suggested KPIs)

MIAK proposes the following performance indicators (KPIs) for tracking — these are not government decisions, but public, verifiable handholds:

  • Irreversibility: whether the term limit remains lasting after 12 months too, and whether it received reinforcing, broad consultation after adoption (e.g. a Venice Commission opinion).
  • Institutional measurement: whether the annual, public Institutional Health Report is produced with at least ten indicators (A6).
  • Procedural quality in asset recovery: what percentage of the reclaimed assets is decided by a court, and what percentage by an administrative/political body.
  • External perception: whether Hungary’s position improves on the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) “rule of law” and “control of corruption” measures (2024 baseline: rule of law +0.35, control of corruption −0.17).

5.2 Summary

MIAK’s message to decision-makers and the public: the temporal limitation of power is a correct aim in principle, but legitimacy is given not by the two-thirds majority but by the quality of the procedure. Concretely, we ask that the present amendment receive an independent constitutional stress test and broad consultation, and that the place of the abolished bodies be filled by measurable institutional guarantees — that there be not merely institutional abolition. This topic engages two MIAK foundational values directly: accountability, because the term limit and institutional measurement serve the regular calling-to-account of power; and ideology-free governance, because the guarantee is credible if it works the same whoever governs — applying not against a single political actor but to everyone equally.

Part VI — Justifications and further sources

6.1 Press framing by spectrum

The topic ran through the entire domestic press spectrum, with differing narrative choices. The left-liberal and public-affairs band (Telex, HVG, 444.hu, 24.hu) focused primarily on the personal dimension of the prime-ministerial term limit — that under the rule the former head of government cannot return — and stressed the recovery of the kekva assets. The economic band (Portfolio) highlighted the financial and EU aspects of settling public assets and university maintenance. The government-party–conservative band (Mandiner, as well as the Fidesz parliamentary group’s statement) framed the amendment as “a brutal restriction of democracy” and as an instrument against the political opponent. For MIAK it is precisely this duality that is the lesson: the dispute is decided by whether the change is perceived as a tailor-made or a general, institutional move — and this is not a rhetorical question, but depends on the quality of the procedure.

6.2 Facts and data

  • April 2026 parliamentary election: the winning formation obtained 141 seats in the 199-seat National Assembly (70.85%), the two-thirds threshold being 134 seats (source: NVI, 2026-04-19 final result).
  • A constitutional amendment requires 134 seats (66.84%) in the 199-seat parliament.
  • Hungary Worldwide Governance Indicators (the World Bank’s governance-quality measures), 2024: government effectiveness +0.42, rule of law +0.35, control of corruption −0.17 (source: World Bank WGI 2024).

6.3 Policy aspects

  • Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points) — the reinforcement of checks and balances, the prevention of the concentration of power and the transparent recovery of siphoned-off public assets;
  • Justice (programme points) — constitutional review, property protection and judicial independence as the procedural guarantees of asset recovery;
  • Public administration and e-government (background material) — the procedural order for abolishing and reshaping constitutional institutions.

6.4 Literature in detail

6.4.1 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

According to the classic thesis of the separation of powers, the condition of liberty is that the legislative, the executive and the judicial power not come into a single hand. In Montesquieu’s formulation:

“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty […]. Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the legislative and executive.”

In the case of the sixteenth amendment to the Fundamental Law this means: the ultimate measure of the prime-ministerial term limit and the institutional changes is whether they distribute or concentrate power. A temporal limit strengthens the separation — but only if it itself works as an independent guarantee detached from the political majority.

📖 Source: Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws

6.4.2 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

The authors’ central thesis is that lasting prosperity depends on inclusive institutions, which distribute power and economic opportunity; extractive institutions, by contrast, concentrate them in the hands of a narrow elite. The distinction provides the backbone of MIAK’s argument: the institution-strengthening and the institution-dismantling move are not the same, even if both happen in the name of “action against the concentration of power”. With the present amendment this is the touchstone: does the term limit make the institutional system more inclusive (distribute power, make alternation predictable), or merely reverse the direction of the concentration?

📖 Source: Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail

6.4.3 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

The authors hold that modern concentration of power works not through open repression but through the quiet subjugation of the information space and the institutions. By one concrete observation of theirs, power maintains itself among other things by narrowing the room for the media, while “denying that it has applied censorship”. Within the frame of Spin Dictators the prime-ministerial term limit is precisely the structural instrument that limits the temporal concentration of power — one precondition of spin dictatorship — in advance and impersonally. This is operationalised by MIAK’s A9 spin-dictatorship-prevention index.

📖 Source: Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

6.5 International comparison

The prime-ministerial/presidential term limit is an internationally established institutional check: in the United States the two presidential terms (the 22nd Amendment) prevent precisely the excessive personal concentration of power. The key lesson is not the limit itself, but that it was fixed at constitutional rank, in a hard-to-change manner, applying to everyone equally — so the rule outlived the individual political actors. Good models for the institutional measurement of checks and balances are the strong, regular review practice of the Colombian Constitutional Court and the more than two-hundred-year independence of the Swedish ombudsman, built on the power of publicity (see the international precedents of A6).

Transparency and anti-corruption policy

  • A6 — Reinforcement of checks and balances
  • A8 — Cohesion-policy accountability
  • A9 — Spin-dictatorship-prevention index

Justice

  • I5 — Protection of property rights
  • I10 — Constitutional “stress test”

6.7 Source register

Press sources (MIAK press monitor, 16 June 2026 — top 10 topics, ranked 1st):

Knowledge-base references (literature):

  • 📖 Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws
  • 📖 Daron Acemoglu – James A. Robinson: Why Nations Fail
  • 📖 Sergei Guriev – Daniel Treisman: Spin Dictators

Note: the books’ local file path does not appear in the blog’s visible text — only the author and the title. The file path is an internal matter of the generation process.

MIAK internal materials:

  • MIAK policy area: Transparency and anti-corruption policy (programme points; programme point ID: A6, A8, A9)
  • MIAK policy area: Justice (programme points; programme point ID: I5, I10)
  • MIAK press monitor, 16 June 2026 — topic 1, score: 95/100

Supplementary public data sources:

  • NVI — final result of the 2026 parliamentary election (2026-04-19)
  • World Bank — Worldwide Governance Indicators 2024 (rule of law, control of corruption)
  • Venice Commission — recommendations on constitutional amendments

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